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Introduction*
Foreign debt problems of developing countries are no longer in
the headlines and of top priority on the agenda of international
bankers and politicians. But the debt crisis is not over even ten
years after its outbreak in 1982. Many Third World economies are
still struggling with a "continued limited availability of exter-
nal finance" [World Bank, b, 1990-91, Vol. 1, p. 3]. New private
lending (net of amortization) remains limited and much below
interest payment obligations. Foreign investors have shifted away
from developing countries and concentrated their engagement on
industrialized countries. Official flows are increasingly linked
to workouts of existing debt, rather than to financing inflows of
goods and services. Arrears constituted the primary source of
international financing in many severely indebted countries;
during 1986-1990, the stock of arrears soared from US$ 40 billion
to more than US$ 110 billion [World Bank, b, 1991-1992, Vol. 1,
p. 15].
However, this overall picture conceals vastly different experi-
ences of different Third World regions and individual debtor
countries. Most economies in Sub-Saharan Africa have never been
an attractive location for internationally mobile risk capital.
They can be expected to remain highly dependant on foreign aid
from official sources as long as essential institutional and
politico-economic weaknesses persist. By contrast, the advanced
developing countries of Asia have established strong competitive
advantages which enabled them to prevent major financing problems
in the 1980s. In all probability, they will remain priority loca-
tions for foreign investors and lenders [Hiemenz, 19 91; Nunnen-
kamp, 1991].
* The authors would like to thank the Instituto de Pesquisa Eco-
nomica Aplicada (IPEA) and especially the Chief of its Macro-
economic Division, Dr. Eduardo Felipe Ohana, for initiating
this study and for the most fruitful and stimulating discus-
sions held in Brasilia on the topics to be addressed in the
subsequent analysis. Thanks are also due to the Programa das
Nacoes Unidas para o Desenvolvimento for providing financial
support to carry out the study.- 2 -
The situation is less straightforward in Latin America, on which
the subsequent analysis if focused. Until the early 1980s, for-
eign investors and creditors were eager to engage in countries
such as Brazil offering favourable profit opportunities because
of large though untapped domestic markets, vast natural resour-
ces, and semi-skilled labour. The picture has changed fundamen-
tally in the 1980s. Competitive advantages were seriously eroded
by external shocks and misguided economic policies so that for-
eign investors and creditors became increasingly reluctant to
transfer further capital to Latin American countries. With fier-
cer worldwide competition for foreign capital, economic policy
failures will become even more telling in the future and result
in even higher economic costs than was the case in the past. The
heavily indebted countries of Latin America will therefore rejoin
the world economic development and attract foreign capital only
through the successful stabilization and structural reform of
their economies. Some countries in this region have responded to
this challenge recently. Others, however, are still lagging
behind major competitors in implementing credible and consistent
reform programs. This refers to Brazil in the first place.
Against this background, the overall aim of this study is to
provide a policy-oriented analysis of international capital flows
to developing countries. The major thrust is on the question how
Latin America, and particularly Brazil, could regain access to
internationally mobile risk capital. The purpose of the study is
threefold: (i) to portray the recent developments in internatio-
nal capital flows, (ii) to analyse their major determinants, and
(iii) to provide a detailed evaluation of Brazil's position in
worldwide competition for foreign capital as compared to its
major competitors.
Chapter I of the study presents an overview on international
capital flows during the 1980s and discusses the recent trends.
Prior attention is paid to the access to capital markets of Latin
American countries in general and Brazil in particular. The major
types of foreign capital flows are analysed separately, i.e. com-
mercial bank lending, foreign direct investment, and capital— 3 —
flows from official sources. The discussion in Chapter I is main-
ly based on the statistical data set presented in Appendix I of
the study.
A summary of empirical analyses on major determinants of the
different types of capital flows to developing countries is given
in Chapter II. Here, the principal aim is to evaluate in a cross-
country perspective the role of domestic economic policies of
recipient countries with respect to their attractiveness for
foreign capital. This assessment is largely based on recent
econometric studies by the Kiel Institute of World Economics and
related work by other researchers. The topical question is whe-
ther there is room for domestic economic policy to (1) improve
the chances to regain access to the international credit market,
(2) enhance the attractiveness for foreign direct investment, and
(3) achieve better economic performance by restructuring the
composition of external financing. The specific problems which
countries such as Brazil might have in achieving these goals
figure prominently in the evaluation of these questions.
In addition, it is discussed in Chapter II in which way the de-
veloping countries' attractiveness for foreign capital is likely
to be affected by recent changes in the international economic
environment. In this context, the possible consequences of Wes-
tern European integration (EC 1992) and the economic transforma-
tion of Central and Eastern Europe are evaluated. Both develop-
ments have raised considerable concern that foreign capital may
be diverted from developing countries and concentrated on Europe.
Again, particular attention is paid to the consequences for Latin
American countries.
In Chapter III, Brazil's current position in the international
competition for investment funds is critically evaluated. Given
Brazil's impaired attractiveness for foreign capital, the pros
and cons of different options to deal with the foreign debt issue
are discussed. It is argued that debt policies may trigger far-
reaching effects on other types of capital inflows as well as
domestic investment. Subsequently, major bottlenecks to an im-- 4 -
proved competitiveness of Brazil are identified. Critical policy-
areas are analysed in some more detail in order to derive conclu-
sions on economic policy measures which may help to improve the
country's position in the worldwide competition for foreign capi-
tal. The focus is on macroeconomic stability, goods- and factor-
market policies, as well as the attitudes towards foreign direct
investment. In discussing these policy issues, Brazil's position
is portrayed relative to its major competitors.
The final chapter of the study summarizes the major policy con-
clusions .
I. International Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Recent
Trends
In the 1980s, developing countries were bypassed by international
lenders and investors, mainly as a consequence of high external
debt and deteriorating economic as well as political conditions.
International capital flowed mainly among industrialized coun-
tries. Very recently, however, the situation has ameliorated
somewhat. The debt crisis appears to be less severe than three
years ago. Debt indicators have slightly improved, and total net
resource flows to developing countries have recovered since 1987.
Despite these positive developments, which can partly be attri-
buted to diverse programs of debt relief and restructuring, as
well as improved export performance of some countries, the debt
crisis is not over. Many developing countries still have to un-
dertake credible adjustment policies and structural reforms that
seem to be a precondition to restore capital flows and economic
growth.
1. Broad Trends in Net Resource Flows
After the 1981 peak, total net resource flows to developing coun-
tries declined gradually until 1986. Measured at 1989 prices and
This section mainly refers to Tables I.I and 1.2 (Appendix I)
and the corresponding references.- 5 -
exchange rates the decline even continued until 1987 [OECD,
1991a, p. 24]. This downward trend since the beginning of the
1980s was dominated by sharp cuts in private capital flows (in-
cluding export credits), which were mainly a result of the inter-
national debt crisis and the loss of creditworthiness of debtor
countries. Despite inherent differences between foreign direct
investment (FDI), international bank loans and export credits,
these various types of flows followed in the first instance a
similar trend.. The parallel movement was supported by the fact
that different types of financing were often combined in the same
project. Isolated from the overall trend, however, official
development finance (ODF) gradually increased in the 19 80s (ex-
cept in 1982-1983) .
After years of decreasing total net resource flows to developing
countries, a slight recovery started in 1987. The general in-
crease was backed by rising ODF and private flows, while net
export credits did not increase before 1989. Preliminary data
confirm the maintenance of this trend in 1990. Total flows in-
creased by 16.1 per cent to US$ 142.4 billion. This impressive
rise, however, largely reflects valuation effects, which were
high in 1990 as the dollar fell against other major currencies,
except the yen (on an annual average basis). At 1989 prices and
exchange rates, total net resource flows increased by only 3.8
per cent from US$ 122.7 billion to US$ 127.3 billion [OECD,
1991a, p 24]. Despite the recent increase, neither total private
flows nor export credits had yet reached their pre-debt crisis
level in 1990.
In general, net resource flows to the Western Hemisphere (Latin
America and the Caribbean) followed a similar trend. Total net
resource flows declined nearly continuously until 1986, before a
gradual recovery started. However, the decline until the mid-
1980s was much more pronounced in the Western Hemisphere than for
other regions. Hence, the share of net resource flows to the
For a disaggregated analysis of FDI in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries, see LANGHAMMER [1991].- 6 -
Western Hemisphere dropped significantly in the beginning of the
last decade, and thereafter oscillated around this lower level
(Table 1). On the contrary, the share of net resource flows to
Asia increased significantly in the early 1980s and remained
relatively stable thereafter.
Table 1 - Share of Asia and Latin America in Total Net Resource Flows to De-
veloping Countries (per cent)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Asia 19.4 22.4 24.0 33.7 31.9 34.8 33.1 32.7 37.6 33.3 33.7
Latin America
and the Caribb. 44.2 46.1 42.6 29.2 34.9 27.2 22.5 23.6 22.1 24.3 28.2
Source: OECD [1989; 1991a]; own calculations.
The sharp decline of total net resource flows to the Western
Hemisphere was also dominated by the fall in private flows. Com-
pared to US$ 45.2 billion in the beginning of the last decade,
private flows fell by 86.3 per cent until 1986 to US$ 6.2 bil-
lion. International bank lending virtually dried up in 1986.
Despite the long-awaited increase of private flows and total
resource flows (in absolute and relative terms) in 1989-1990, the
pre-debt crisis level has by far not yet been reached. Prelimi-
nary data show that total resource flows still accounted only for
72.1 per cent, and private flows only for 54.1 per cent of the
1980-level. Moreover, the rise in private flows in 1989-1990
deserves further comment [OECD, 1991a, p. 21]:
- The financial situation among the countries of the Western
Hemisphere is highly diverse. Only a small number of countries
(essentially Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela) benefited
from the recent increase of private flows. The majority of
Latin American countries has remained unattractive for foreign
capital so far, although most recent trends suggest that an
increasing number of them may succeed to reattract foreign
investors and lenders.- 7 -
- Excluding interest arrears (principally in Argentina, Brazil
and Peru), total net bank lending in 1988 -1989 was slightly
negative, but became positive in 1990.
- A substantial part of the newly issued securities was taken up
by holders of Mexican flight capital abroad. The recent exper-
iences of Mexico and Chile suggest that flight capital offers a
potential that could be used to help financing Latin American
countries in the future.
2. Commercial Bank Lending and Capital Markets
The modest increase of commercial bank claims on developing coun-
tries since the mid-1980s was accompanied by a significant regio-
nal redistribution of claims. In particular, the share of claims
on Latin America dropped from 42.6 per cent in 1986 to 32.6 per
cent in 199 0, whereas the share of claims on Asia increased from
19.9 per cent to 26.5 per cent during the same period. The drop
in the Latin American share was mostly a consequence of the de-
crease of short-term and unguaranteed long-term flows.
To deal with the specific Latin American problems since the be-
ginning of the debt crisis, four different phases of commercial
bank lending can be identified [SECCHI, 1991, pp. 175 ff]. Initi-
ally, the involved banks agreed to rescheduling arrangements,
thereby accepting a different timing of principal and interest
payments. In this period, German, French and Swiss banks seemed
to be more aware of the problems inherited from previous generous
lending. They undertook precautionary measures to face possible
future payment difficulties of debtor countries. On the contrary,
US and UK banks still seemed to be less concerned of possible
future losses.
The second phase can be characterized by the Baker plan, which
aimed at new lending and stimulating future growth in the debtor
This section mainly refers to Tables II.1-II.5 as well as
Tables V.I and V.2 (Appendix I) and the corresponding refer-
ences .- 8 -
countries. But commercial banks were reluctant to lend fresh
money to already highly indebted countries. It became obvious
that most of these debtors were not able or willing to service
their debt. The market value of the debt and the value of shares
of the main creditor banks dropped. Also US and UK Lanks became
more and more aware of the difficulties associated with the in-
ternational debt situation. From summer 1987 on, they have also
started to increase their reserves in order to reduce their fi-
nancial vulnerability.
During the third phase, banks generally tried to reduce their
commitments to and exposure in highly indebted developing coun-
tries. More market-oriented techniques were used to deal with the
debt problem, including the development of and more active
trading in the secondary debt market. This strategy clearly im-
proved the creditor banks' financial position, but, in general,
did not improve the debtor countries' access to foreign capital.
The latest phase started with the implementation of the Brady
plan in 1989.The current approach can be characterized by a case-
by-case treatment of debt problems, including the possibility of
concerted debt and debt-service reductions (e.g. in the case of
Mexico, the Philippines, Costa Rica, and Venezuela).
These four phases are reflected in the lending patterns of banks
from the major creditor countries:
- In 1985, US commercial banks were still the main creditors to
all developing countries, as well as to Latin America and Bra-
zil, although French, UK and German banks also held substantial
claims. During the last years, US banks have significantly
reduced their claims. Between 1985 and 1990, they cut their ex-
posure in all developing countries by 46.4 per cent to US$ 69.4
billion. They also reduced their claims on Latin America and
Brazil substantially. Nevertheless, US banks remained the main
creditors of Brazil in 1990 in absolute terms (recent data for
Japanese banks are not available).
- Similarly, UK banks have curtailed their engagement in all- 9 -
developing countries; in the second half of the 1980s, their
claims fell by 31.9 per cent to US$ 44 billion. Moreover, UK
banks reduced their claims on Latin America and Brazil more
than proportionally.
- On the contrary, French and German banks increased their claims
on developing countries as a whole, but reduced the share of
Latin America and Brazil. In absolute terms, however, German
banks still increased their claims on Brazil to US$ 9.5 billion
in 1990 (1985: US$ 6.1 billion).
Table II. 4 reveals most obviously the fundamental problem Latin
American countries were facing: Negative net transfers fluctuated
between US$ 14-21 billion annually in the second half of the
1980s. Negative net transfers can mainly be attributed to the
fact that total credit disbursements of commercial banks have
diminished considerably. In 1980, disbursements reached US$ 33.2
billion, while debt-service payments (interest and principal
payments) amounted to US$ 30.3 billion. In 1989, disbursements
were down to US$ 5.1 billion, while debt-service payments were
reduced to US$ 19 billion. The Latin American situation influ-
enced - nearly determined - the overall trend. Disbursements to
all developing countries were reduced by US$ 28.6 billion between
1980 and 1989. The similar absolute reduction to the Western
Hemisphere (US$ 28.1 billion) shows that, on average, disburse-
ments to the remaining developing countries were approximately
constant. Furthermore, half of the net financial resource flows
to foreign commercial banks was transfered by the Western Hemi-
sphere. Within Latin America, the situation in all major debtor
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico) was similar.
The general downward trend in international lending to developing
countries in the 1980s is also reflected in Table V.I, which
portrays the development of funds raised on international capital
markets. Compared with the mid-1980s, all developing countries
together raised 22 per cent less funds on international capital
markets in 1990. Most Latin American countries lost access to
these markets towards the end of the 1980s. After US$ 16 billion
in 1984, the region as a whole raised only US$ 1.6 billion in
1990. The share of new Latin American bonds and loans dropped
from 4 6.3 to 6.2 per cent.- 10 -
The above analysis suggests that all private lenders have been
well aware of the serious debt problems in Latin America and
reacted similarly, though at a different speed, by curtailing
their engagement in this region. Most recent (preliminary) data
indicate, however, a slight improvement in the financial rela-
tions of developing countries with Western commercial banks
(Table la):
- For all developing countries and also for Latin America, a
modest increase of credit disbursements is estimated for the
early 1990s as compared to 1989. For the time being, net trans-
fers continue to be negative. But negative net transfers of
Latin America are estimated to be reduced to about US$ 7
billion per annum in 1990-1992, i.e. to about half the amount
reported in 1989.
- The picture is fairly favourable for Mexico. Negative net
transfers are expected to be down from US$ 7 billion in 1989 to
around US$ 1 billion in the early 1990s. This is mainly because
of drastically reduced debt-service obligations.
- By contrast, high debt-service obligations are projected for
Brazil in 1991-1992. Notwithstanding an increase of loan dis-
bursements, net transfers are likely to remain significantly
negative unless Brazil and its creditor banks reach an agree-
ment on debt-service reductions.
Several Latin American countries, including Mexico, Brazil and
Venezuela, made some progress in regaining access to internati-
onal capital markets [WORLD BANK, 1991]. Particularly the case of
Mexico demonstrates that, based on credible economic reforms,
"innovative" Euro-market issues are not out of reach for Latin
American countries. In the second quarter of 1991, Mexico
launched a first Euro-convertible issue. This type of issue,
which had already been used by various Asian developing coun-
tries, could remain an interesting alternative, in particular for
Latin American countries undertaking successful privatization- 11 -
programs. After the absence of Japanese issues, Euro-convertibles
still seem to be attractive for investors.
Although Brazil's debt negotiations did not deem to make signifi-
cant progress until mid-1991, several deals with Brazilian borro-
wers have started. Recently; Petrobras, Brazil's state oil compa-
ny, entered into Euro-markets and issued the first Brazilian
Euro-bond since the outbreak of the debt crisis. Further Brazi-
lian issues followed, including a US$ 200 million deal of Tele-
bras, the state-owned telecommunications company. Furthermore,
the first interest-rate swap for a Brazilian company was arranged
by Chase Manhattan. However, it is open to question whether the
slight progress which has been made in approaching international
capital markets is sustainable and could be extended, unless the
fundamental problems underlying Brazil's impaired attractiveness
for foreign capital are tackled (see Chapter III).
3. Foreign Direct Investment
Worldwide FDI flows increased considerably in recent years. They
nearly tripled from US$ 63.3 billion in 1981 to US$ 181.8 billion
in 1989. The impressive overall trend in FDI flows was accompa-
nied by significant shifts between industrialized and developing
countries on the one hand, and among developing countries on the
other hand [LANGHAMMER, 1991]. As in the case of international
bank lending, FDI flows have become more concentrated on devel-
oped countries. France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US were
the major source and host countries of FDI. In 1987, these coun-
tries were the target of approximately 60 per cent of all FDI
inflows and the source of roughly 80 per cent of all FDI outflows
[UNIDO, 1990, p.4].
Developing countries as a whole lost their attractiveness as
hosts of FDI relative to industrialized countries. In 1989, FDI
flows to developing countries had not yet reached their pre-debt
This section mainly refers to Tables III.1-III.4 (Appendix I)
and the corresponding references.- 12 -
Table la - Commercial Bank Lending to Developing Countries - Disbursements,
Debt Service and Net Transfers: 1985-1992 (US$ billion)






















































































































e = estimated; p = projected.
Data for 1985 and 1989 are slightly revised figures as given in the Supple-
ment to the World Debt Tables, and are not fully comparable to Table II.4.
Source: WORLD BANK, World Debt Tables 1990-91; and Supplement to World Debt
Tables 1990-91, August 1991.biDiiofhek
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crisis level; FDI inflows amounted to US$ 18.5 billion, compared
to US$ 25.2 billion in 1982. The share of developing countries in
total FDI inflows amounted to roughly 40 per cent during the
1960s and one third during the 1970s. A sharp decline occurred in
the 1980s; their share was down to 10.2 per cent in 1989. The
reorientation of FDI towards developed countries is also reflec-
ted by the respective growth rates: In the 1983-1989 period, FDI
flows to developing countries increased only by 18.9 per cent, as
compared to 271.6 per cent in the case of industrialized coun-
tries .
Furthermore, FDI took only place in relatively few - mostly fair-
ly advanced - developing countries. In the late 1980s, just 18
countries accounted for approximately 86 per cent of the flows of
FDI to all developing countries [UNIDO, 1990, p. 7]. The debt
crisis and the depressed economic conditions had a significant
impact on FDI flows to Latin America. FDI inflows dropped from
US$ 7.7 billion in 1981 to US$ 3.2 billion in 1986; despite the
subsequent increase, the 1981-level has not yet been reached.
Besides the general negative impact of the debt crisis, the rela-
tive importance of different source countries for FDI flows to
Latin America changed substantially. In the beginning of the
1980s, the share of the US reached 56.3 per cent, whereas Japan
provided 13.9 per cent and Europe 27.9 per cent. Towards the end
of the 1980s, Japan's share increased to 32.8 per cent and Eu-
rope's share to 46.8 per cent. On the contrary, the share of the
US dropped to 19.3 per cent. Within Latin America, US investors
showed a high preference for FDI in Mexico. Among European in-
vestors, Germany, the UK and Switzerland played the most im-
portant role. They provided approximately 77 per cent of European
flows to Latin America.
Even for the prefered investment locations, FDI typically
accounted for a fairly small portion of total fixed capital
formation. The only exception over years was Singapore, where
the share of FDI was above 10 per cent. By contrast, FDI con-
tributed to far less than 5 per cent to overall gross fixed
capital formation in Latin American countries such as Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia.- 14 -
With respect to the specific situation of Brazil, Table III. 4
reveals that Japan, the UK and the US played the most important
role as source countries in 1988-1990. However, total FDI flows
dropped significantly in 1989 and 1990, after total flows had
increased in 1987 and 1988 (data are based on the US$ rate of
December 31, 1990); flows were only US$ 0.5 billion in 1990.
In sharp contrast to the situation of Brazil, preliminary data
for 1990 suggest that high FDI inflows took place in several
Asian as well as selected Latin American countries. The main
reasons for this recovery are as follows [OECD, 1991a, p.16]:
- Several Asian countries achieved substantial economic growth
rates, and the prospects for economic growth improved in some
Latin American countries (e.g. Chile, Mexico).
- New investment opportunities arose from economic adjustment
programs, which included the privatization of state enterprises
and debt-equity conversions.
- Recently, an increasing number of developing countries accepted
that the private sector should play a decisive role for future
export performance and economic growth.
- Reform programs established in coordination with multilateral
institutions had a catalytic effect.
In essence, the most recent trends suggest that credible economic
reforms are honoured by foreign investors with increasing FDI
flows. This may provide important lessons for Brazil which
appears to be lagging behind in implementing such reforms (for a
detailed discussion, see Chapter III).
4. Official Development Finance
Official development finance (ODF) - bilateral and multilateral, -
consists of concessional development assistance (ODA) and other
This section mainly refers to Tables IV. 1 and IV.2 (Appendix
I) and the corresponding references.- 15 -
ODF. ODA comprises grants and loans with a grant element of at
least 25 per cent. Other ODF mainly includes non-concessional
loans from DAC member countries, multilateral lending, as well as
the consolidation of arrears on bilateral debt [OECD, 1991a, p.
14].
During the last decade, total net flows of ODF to all developing
countries gradually expanded to about US$ 7 8 billion. The share
of ODF in total net resource flows increased from 35.4 per cent
in. 1980 to 54.5 per cent in 1990. In 1990, 80.6 per cent of total
ODF was given in the form of ODA. ODF has become more concen-
trated on low-income countries (LICs) which accounted for 63 per
cent of total ODF at the end of the 1980s, compared to 52 per
cent in 1981-1982 [SECCHI, 1991]. Nevertheless, the Latin Ameri-
can share in ODF was relatively stable (11 - 15 per cent).
A more disaggregated analysis shows that Latin America has re-
ceived a substantial part of ODF from the EC and individual Euro-
pean DAC member countries, which together are the largest donor
to Latin America in absolute terms (followed by the US and
Japan). In 1986-1988, 27.6 per cent of ODF funds came from
Europe, after roughly 17 per cent in the early 1980s. The EC and
its member countries increased the share of flows devoted to
Latin America from 6.4 per cent in 1980-1982 to 11.9 per cent in
1986-1988, and are close to the world average now. Within
Europe, Germany remained the major donor to Latin America and
also to Brazil. Recently, Italy increased its flows rapidly and
nearly reached the volume of France in 1986-1988. On the contra-
ry, the UK only played a minor role during the last decade.
With respect to the regional distribution within Latin America,
South America received approximately two thirds of European
outflows, but less than one quarter of ODF from the US. More than
75 per cent of the ODF flows of the US to Latin America were
directed towards Central America [SECCHI, 1991].
The situation of Brazil differs somewhat from the overall picture- 16 -
for Latin America. After ODF flows more than doubled between 1980
and 1985 (to US$ 2.1 billion), the volume decreased to roughly
one quarter of the 1985-level in 1988, and recovered only modest-
ly in 1989. The relative importance of flows from the EC and its
member countries increased dramatically in the 1980s (1980: 22.1
per cent; 1987-1988: 86.4 per cent). Within the EC, France and
Germany were the main donors. Net ODF flows of the US to Brazil
were negative in 1988 (US$ -15 million) and 1989 (US$ -200
million).
5. Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries in the Medium Term
The above analysis of recent capital flows shows that, as a con-
sequence of the debt crisis, private flows to developing coun-
tries were substantially reduced during the 1980s. This was espe-
cially true for Latin America. Only very recently, some Latin
American countries regained limited access to international capi-
tal markets. This raises the question about the future prospects
of developing countries in attracting foreign capital.
A scenario for aggregate net resource flows to developing coun-
tries in the medium term is offered by the WORLD BANK [1990, pp.
44-51]. Based on the World Bank's working hypothesis that devel-
oping countries continue with their adjustment policies, net
resource flows might increase slightly faster than industrial
countries' GNP during the coming years. In its base scenario, the
World Bank projects an annual growth rate of 7.4 per cent for
aggregate net resource flows to developing countries in 1989-
1995. When applying the World Bank's estimations of average
growth rates for different types of flows until 1995 to OECD base
data, the scenario given in Table 2 is obtained.
The current composition of aggregate net resource flows is not
expected to change significantly [WORLD BANK, 1990, pp. 44-51]:
- ODF is expected to contribute significantly to total net re-
source flows also in the future. In particular, multilateral
lending is expected to rise quickly, partly as a result of
recent capital increases of the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank.- 17 -













Total net resource flows
Official development finance 45.7 64.9 98.5 109.9
Private flows ' 66.1 48.3 75.3 88.1
Foreign direct investment 11.2 30.4 43.1 42.8
International bank lending 49.0 10.5 24.3 37.2
P: Projection
The scenario is based on the World Bank's estimation of the annual growth
rates until 1995. However, base data refer to OECD statistics. The base
period for the first column of 1995 is 1989, for the second column the pre-
liminary OECD data for 1990 are used.
Source: WORLD BANK [1990, p. 45]; OECD [1991a]; own calculations.
- A solid economic environment is deemed necessary to support
additional private flows. In relative terms, international bank
lending could increase to some extent given the low volume in
1989, but will hardly reach the pre-debt crisis level soon.
Creditworthiness will have to be restored first. Furthermore,
Japanese banks are likely to be reluctant to expand lending
because of the need to rebuild capital. Besides traditional
bank lending, a number of more recent techniques, including
project finance, could play a more important role in the
future.
- The attractiveness of debt-equity swaps largely contributed to
the recent increase in FDI. Due to the diminishing debt over-
hang, the motivation for debt-equity programs could decrease.
Furthermore, FDI in manufacturing which aims at domestic mar-
kets is expected to be limited, except in rapidly growing coun-
tries. On the contrary, large privatization programs in a some-
what more stable environment could induce increasing FDI flows,
provided that credible arrangements are offered for remittan-
ces. Hence, the expected annual average increase of FDI by 6
per cent depends to a large extent on country-specific condi-
tions, and could be higher in well performing economies.- 18 -
The above scenario suggests that capital flows will not rise
massively on average. It has to be stressed that a wide margin of
error has to be taken into account when projecting financial
flows to developing countries. A number of external uncertain-
ties , including the consequences of the current changes in the
international economic environment (for a more detailed discus-
sion, see Chapter II.2), might lead to substantial deviations
from the projected flows. Furthermore, from an individual coun-
try's point of view it is extremely relevant how total flows are
allocated between developing countries. It can be expected that
the country-specific performance determines to a large extent the
availability of funds for a particular country. Therefore, the
major determinants of capital flows to developing countries will
be analysed in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
II. Major Determinants of Recent Capital Flows to Developing
Countries
1. The Role of Domestic Policies in Developing Countries
a. Determinants of International Creditworthiness
Risk illusions of creditors were a crucial factor as concerns the
generous bank lending to developing countries that occurred until
the early 1980s. Credit guarantees provided by the borrowers' and
lenders' governments distorted the incentives to follow macro-
- r
economically efficient lending strategies. Banks did not rigo-
rously discriminate between good and bad credit risks [NUNNEN-
KAMP, 1986a]. But even after risk illusions had been destroyed it
continued to be heavily debated whether the access to foreign
loans could be encouraged by favourable domestic policies and
good economic performance. The confusion about the determinants
of commercial lending appears to be mainly because conflicting
hypotheses apply to different lending regimes. Most importantly,
a distinction has to be drawn between voluntary lending and de-
fensive lending (which is sometimes called "involuntary"
lending).- 19 -
It is no longer to be disputed that the borrowers' economic poli-
cies figured prominently in determining whether or not external
debt became unmanageable . Provided that private creditors have
learnt this lesson, well performing countries should have had
better access to voluntary lending recently. Additional loans for
supply constrained borrowers could be expected to be positively
related to policy and performance indicators such as higher in-
vestment ratios, increasing world-market shares, real exchange
2
rate devaluation, and reduced government budget deficits . How-
ever, the impact of domestic policies is less straightforward
under conditions of defensive or "involuntary" lending. In this
case, favourable policies and good performance may even lead to
reduced, rather than increased, bank lending [KRUGMAN, 1988;
1989]. This is because it may be in a bank syndicate's interest
to provide loans "involuntarily" to problem debtors in order to
protect existing claims. According to this reasoning, the incen-
tive of banks to orchestrate new loans is weakened if the market
valuation of the inherited debt improves due to policy reforms
and better economic performance of the debtor.
In order to test these conflicting hypotheses on the role of
domestic economic policies, separate (pooled cross-country) re-
gressions were run for 14 developing countries for which defen-
sive lending has been orchestrated in the 1980s, and for 12
developing countries not benefiting from such lending [NUNNEN-
For a discussion of domestic policies with regard to debt pro-
blems, see e.g. BANETH [1986]; KHAN and KNIGHT [1983]; NUNNEN-
KAMP [1986b] and ZAIDI [1985].
2
By contrast, lending is demand determined in the case of non-
constrained borrowers. The focus of this paper being on Latin
America, lending to non-constrained borrowers is not considered
in the following. For conceptual details, see NUNNENKAMP
[1986a; 1986b, Chapter 6].
Defensive or "involuntary" lending was defined according to
WATSON et al. [1988]. This lending regime comprises countries
for which concerted credit extension, i.e. equiproportional
increases in loan exposure coordinated by bank advisory com-
mittees, took place. The lending to all countries without such
concerted credit extension is considered to be voluntary in the
following.- 20 -
KAMP, 1990]. Net transfers (NTR) and, alternatively, gross dis-
bursements (DIS) of loans from private sources were considered as
2
dependent variables.
The results presented in Table 3 strongly contest the notion of
bad policies inducing further lending, which would have required
significantly negative signs of the investment ratio (INVR),
world-market performance (WMSHD) and the exchange rate variable
(REXR). Hence, it would be a losing proposition for credit
constrained countries to attempt attracting more (defensive)
lending by consciously adopting unfavourable economic policies.
The results rather indicate that it pays for borrowers to imple-
ment adjustment programs in order to improve their economic per-
formance. Private creditors honoured adjustment efforts in the
1980s by easing credit constraints, most notably in the case of
higher investment ratios, better world-market performance and
real exchange rate devaluation. This conclusion also holds for
developing countries for which defensive lending had been orches-
trated .
The empirical evidence demonstrates that policy reforms are in-
dispensable in order to restore the international creditworthi-
ness of credit constrained debtors. This does not mean, however,
that narrowly defined adjustment programs are a sufficient condi-
tion for a resumption of commercial bank lending on a voluntary
basis [NUNNENKAMP, 1988]. This qualification is particularly
relevant for Latin America where sovereign risk and credibility
problems have become evident since the early 1980s [see also
EL-ERIAN, 1991].
For a similar approach, see EATON and GERSOVITZ [1980; 1981a].
By contrast, most other empirical studies did not distinguish
different lending regimes [e.g. EDWARDS, 1984; 1986; NUNNEN-
KAMP, 1986a].
2
For detailed definitions of variables and data sources, see
Appendix II.
The negative sign of DEFR in the NTR-equation for countries
without defensive lending cannot be interpreted as an indica-
tion that bad policies were honoured. It rather reveals that
these countries could no longer finance high public sector
deficits once net transfers were reduced.- 21 -
Table 3 - The Impact of Economic Policies, External Shocks and Sovereign Risk on Net







































































































































aAll regressions were estimated using the ordinary least squares technique. For detailed
definitions of variables and data sources, see Appendix II. All explaining variables,
except EDTG, were calculated as averages of periods t and t-1. t-statistics in parenthe-
ses; ** indicates significance at the 5 per cent level (two-tailed t-test); * 10 per
cent level. - TRADE excluded in order to avoid serious multicollinearity problems.
Source: NUNNENKAMP [1990].
Sovereign-risk considerations relate to the willingness of a
country to service external obligations. The impact of sovereign
risk on private lending to developing countries is ambiguous at
the theoretical level. According to standard arguments, rational
lenders will consider the borrowers' incentives to default when
deciding whether to grant further credits (for an overview, see
EATON et al. [1986]). Therefore, voluntary lending is supposed to
be negatively related to the benefits to be reaped from defaul-
ting on external debt, and positively related to the potential
costs of such debtor behaviour. However, the expectation of
The borrowers' benefits from default primarily depend on the
debt-service burden [EATON, GERSOVITZ, 1981b, p. 302]. When
considering the default costs, the borrowers have to take into
account the sanctions that may be imposed on them by the credi-
tors [SACHS, 1984, pp. 17f.].- 22 -
default may induce, rather than prevent, further lending to con-
strained borrowers once debt-servicing problems have emerged
[KRUGMAN, 1988; COHEN, SACHS, 1986, pp. 539f.]. The latter reaso-
ning suggests that the bargaining power of debtors in transfer
negotiations increases if accumulated debt is high enough to pose
a serious threat for the creditors' financial position. Potential
benefits from default are thus expected to be positively related
to additional defensive lending.
Lending decisions were indeed affected by sovereign risk conside-
rations in the 1980s. In Table 3, the borrowers' potential bene-
fits from default are proxied by total debt-service obligations
(DSERG). This proxy indicates the amount of domestic resources
which could be saved by not making credit payments. Under condi-
tions of defensive lending, credit disbursements (DIS) were posi-
tively related to a higher contractual debt-service burden. At
first sight, this appears to support the KRUGMAN-line of reaso-
ning that further lending is to be expected once DSERG reveals a
higher default probability. However, the observation that a
higher debt-service burden induced higher loan disbursements is
mainly because of the way reschedulings were typically organized
in the 1980s. Especially US banks insisted on the transfer of
interest payments to avoid that loans had to be classified as
non-performing. Additional credits were granted to ensure that
interest payments could be made by borrowers. Not surprisingly,
the need to refinance interest obligations was positively related
to the debt-service burden.
However, defensive loan disbursements did not improve the borro-
wers' access to international capital markets in terms of additi-
onal net financing. In contrast to the DIS-equation, the banks'
incentive to ensure that interest payments are made by debtors
did not result in higher net transfers (NTR). The empirical
estimates of the NTR-eguation rather support the standard sover-
eign risk argument that net transfers are negatively related to- 23 -
the benefits that debtors may realize by defaulting on external
debt. The latter finding is most important since negative net
transfers - experienced by Latin American countries in the recent
past - constitute the central problem in international credit
relations. Hence, credit constrained debtors are interested in
higher net transfers, rather than credit disbursements per se.
All in all, the empirical results on the determinants of commer-
cial bank lending to developing countries suggest that domestic
policy reforms are indispensable in order to restore internatio-
nal creditworthiness. But economic adjustment programs have to be
supplemented by policy measures that contain sovereign risk and
credibility problems. Such measures should aim at reducing the
considerable uncertainties private creditors are presently facing
in many Latin American countries whether governments will stick
to a preannounced policy course (for more detailed policy con-
clusions, see Section Il.l.d).
b. Domestic Policies and the Attractiveness for Foreign Direct
Investment
The question of how to revitalize foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows to developing countries after the decline of FDI in the
1970s and early 1980s is today all the more relevant, as expecta-
tions are being pinned increasingly on FDI to alleviate foreign
debt problems. However, many heavily indebted countries may not
only be constrained in terms of new private lending but also in
terms of FDI inflows. In order to overcome constraints in the
supply of FDI, the determinants of FDI flows have to be identi-
fied in the first place. In the following, the focus is on deter-
minants that may provide scope for policy action by the host
countries (for a more comprehensive assessment, see AGARWAL et
al. [1991]).
The evidence on the impact of sanctions which may be imposed by
creditors when default occurs is fairly poor. The proxies of
potential default costs, i.e. trade dependence (TRADE), short-
term trade financing (SHDEX) and the variability of domestic
absorption (STDG) remained insignificant. This result adds to
the widespread scepticism about the effectiveness and credibil-
ity of the threat to impose sanctions.- 24 -
Among the factors that have been often considered in the litera-
ture to be of major importance in determining the movement of FDI
- especially to developing countries - are: the intensity of
trade relations and the degree of import protection, the size
2
and growth of the host countries' domestic markets, currency
3 4
valuation, and labour costs. But in order to analyse the de-
velopment of FDI in the 1980s, the set of explanatory variables
has to be extended to include non-traditional factors, i.e.:
- the impact of different attitudes of host countries towards
FDI, i.e. restrictions and regulations imposed on the activi-
ties of foreign investors;
- the impact of political and economic instability; and
- the effects of a debt overhang and sovereign risk relating to
the possibility of future expropriation and restrictions im-
posed on capital repatriation and profit remittances.
The relevance of trade relations and developing countries' trade
policies has been evaluated for the hosts of German FDI [AGARWAL
et al., 1991]. The pooled cross-country regression for the 1977-
1987 period revealed the following result:
(1) FDIR = 0.64** • FDIR(-l) + 0.28** • YR + 0.22* • EXRG
(10.5) (4.2) (2.5)




1 See e.g. AGARWAL [1978]; SCHRODER [1986]; GUBITZ [1988]; EUH,
MIN [1986]; and KUMAR [1987].
2 See e.g. BANDERA, WHITE [1968]; TAKAHASHI [1975]; and SCHWARTZ
[1976] .
3 See e.g. ALIBER [1971; 1972]; and FROOT, STEIN [1989].
4 See e.g. KRAVIS, LIPSEY [1982]; and STEVENS [1973].
Dependent variable: deflated German gross FDI outflows (FDIR).
For the definition of the controlling variables (YR, EXDMR,
GU), see Appendix II. All variables, except GU, expressed in
logarithmic terms, t-value in parentheses; **, * significant at
1 and 10 per cent levels; number of observations: 19 8.- 25 -
The trade regime of host countries turned out to be an important
factor of the policy framework for (German) FDI. Sometimes it is
argued that import barriers serve as an incentive for FDI as the
latter is a medium to jump over protectionist fences. Survey
studies on the motivation of foreign investors to engage in a
country provided some support for this view. For example, KAYSER
et al. [1981] concluded that German FDI was often undertaken to
overcome trade restrictions in developing countries. By the eco-
nometric exercise of equation (1), however, export activity is
shown to be a predecessor of FDI in developing countries. Market
penetration (measured by EXRG, i.e. German exports in relation to
the host country's GNP) had a significantly positive impact on
FDI, while the degree of import barriers in the host countries
affected FDI negatively.
The rate of import protection was measured in two ways: TAR in
equation (1) represents the unweighted average of total import
charges. Alternatively, TAR was replaced by an indicator for the
frequency of non-tariff trade measures (results not shown). In
both variants, trade barriers turned out to be an obstacle,
rather than an incentive, for German companies to invest in de-
veloping countries. This challenges the widespread belief that
import protection is a promising means to attract FDI. Especially
in countries with small domestic markets, this strategy is bound
to fail. But even for fairly large economies, openness with
regard to foreign trade appears to be superior in the longer run.
The goods produced in sheltered economies typically involve high
costs and are not competitive in international markets. Highly
protectionist countries will, therefore, not be considered as
favourable investment locations by multinational companies aiming
primarily at worldwide sourcing and net-working.
The impact of traditional and non-traditional factors on overall
FDI flows to developing countries (DIUSD) is shown by the regres-
sion results presented in Table 4. The estimates were based on
pooled cross-country OLS regressions for the 1980s. However, the
country coverage and the estimation period differs between the- 26 -
various estimates. This is mainly because of data constraints.
FDI flows were clearly stimulated by higher real growth rates
(dYR) and relatively large domestic markets (GNP) (Section A,
Table 4). This demonstrates that foreign investors were ready to
invest if the economic performance of a country offered good
profit opportunities. Total hourly labour costs (TLC) are highly
significant - but with an unexpected positive sign - when con-
sidered at absolute levels. This result appears to contradict the
traditional argument of low labour costs attracting FDI. However,
it is unit-labour costs, i.e. productivity-adjusted rather than
absolute wage levels, which matter for investors. The labour cost
variable turned insignificant when TLC was corrected for labour
productivity gains (i.e., in the case of TLC - (VAD1 + VAD2) ;
results not shown). This may still be surprising insofar as a
negative sign could be expected. Nevertheless, this result is
quite reasonable:
- Because of the lack of labour-cost data, the estimates had to
be based on the experience of only 10 countries in the 1977-
1985 period. Most of these sample countries had adopted import-
substitution strategies. Consequently, multinational companies
aiming at exploiting the domestic market potential of these
host countries applied relatively capital-intensive production
techniques so that unit-labour costs were of less relevance.
The exchange-rate variable introduced as a controlling variable
in some of the equations (see e.g. EXUS in Section A, Table 4)
is not discussed in the following. Principally, it can be hypo-
thesized that a devaluation of the local currency encourages
FDI inflows, while such inflows may be discouraged by high
volatility of exchange rates. However, empirical results are
not very dependable (for details, see AGARWAL et al. [1991, pp.
13ff. and pp. 72f.]). Exchange-rate volatility which negatively
affects trade relations in the first instance can even induce
export-substituting FDI devoted to the domestic markets of host
countries, if investment is a means to bypass the foreign ex-
change market to some extent. Furthermore, FDI data cannot be
appropriately split up into a price and a quantity component.
Hence, the exchange-rate effects on FDI flows in real terms can
hardly be isolated, especially if FDI flows have to be approxi-
mated by changes in FDI stocks. For example, the (negative)
effects of devaluation on the valuation of existing stocks in
the respective host country may outweigh the (positive) effects
on new FDI inflows.- 27 -
Table 4 - Determinants of Total Net FDI Inflows to Developing
Countries (DIUSD)
A. Traditional Explanations, 1977-1985
DIUSD = 0.508***DIUSD(-l) - 0.126***EXUS + 0.115*GNP + 3.675*dYR
(6.7) (-6.3) (1.8) (1.9)
+ 1.063**TLC - 0.202VAD1 - 0.478*VAD2 + 49.58**GU R
J = 0.99
(4.8) (-0.9) (-2.0) (3.7) NOB: 81
B. Political and Economic Instability, 1980-1987
DIUSD
0 = -248.01* - 158.41**PS - 1.61**PSL - 56.33SSL(-2)
(-2.11) (-2.83) (-5.84) (-1.05)
+ 0.25INF + 16.39**INV + 0.05**LSTOCK R
2 =0.52
(0.66) (3.38) (6.47) NOB: 97
C. Debt Overhang, 1981-1987
d
DIUSD = 209.5** + 9.65**DII + 5.75**GDP R
2 = 0.42
(3.23) (2.84) (5.61) NOB: 146
D. Sovereign Risk, 1982-1987
6
a) Countries with restrictive attitudes towards FDI
DIUSD
0 = -48.5 - 4135.J*BENST - 122.48**PRESCU - 75.62UMS + 0.097**LSTOCK




b) Countries with favourable attitudes towards FDI
-32.1 + 3282.7**BENST - 7.99PRESCU - 1.67
(-0.46) (4.29) (-0.89) (-0.03) (-1.19)
DIUSD




All regressions were estimated using the ordinary least squares technique.
Standard errors used to calculate the t-statistics given in parentheses below
the coefficients have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Values in paren-
theses behind a variable indicate the length of a time lag. For the defini-
tion of variables, see Appendix II. **, * significant at the 1 and 10 per
cent levels. - All variables except GU expressed in logarithmic terms. -
CThree-period moving average. - DIUSD + 0; DII (1980) > 40. -
 6DIUSD = 0
included.
Source: AGARWAL et al. [1991].- 28 -
- Moreover, it has to be taken into account that opposing effects
of labour costs on different types of FDI may neutralize each
other. Follow-up inflows of FDI are induced insofar as capital
widening of existing companies is encouraged by rising labour
costs if the production technology allows for substitution be-
tween labour and capital. By contrast, the creation of new
plants is likely to be discouraged. Hence, it would be strongly
misleading for developing countries to conclude that labour
costs are irrelevant for the decisions of foreign investors.
Even fast growing economies with labour cost advantages may,
however, fail to attract FDI inflows when the government's stance
towards foreign investors is overly restrictive. This is reflec-
ted in the significantly positive coefficient of GU. Higher
values of this variable indicate a relatively high degree of
openness towards FDI, e.g. in terms of liberal ownership regula-
tions, non-bureaucratic approval procedures and favourable rules
on the repatriation of profits and capital. It is noteworthy that
hostility vis-a-vis foreign investors, still spread in the 1970s,
disappeared considerably in the 1980s [UNCTC, 1988]. Many de-
veloping countries have relaxed restrictions on the activities of
foreign investors. This trend may seriously impair the attrac-
tiveness for FDI of those host countries that maintained fairly
strict regulations.
Political and economic instabilities, especially if they are
expected to continue in the future, tend to increase the problems
of cost-benefit analysis by entrepreneurs and, thus, to dis-
courage them from investments. The traditional determinants of
FDI may again be overruled if host countries were characterized
by serious political and economic instability. Section B of Table
4 indeed shows that political instability (PS) and labour-market
unrest (PSL) clearly reduced the attractiveness of a country for
foreign investors (see also EDWARDS [1991]). The impact of econo-- 29 -
mic instability was less straightforward. High and stable invest-
ment ratios (INV) as a sign of economic stability helped to
attract foreign equity capital . By contrast, inflation (INF) did
not significantly impact on FDI, notwithstanding that it could be
considered to be a clear indication of an unsound management of
the economy. This surprising result can be attributed to the fact
that many foreign investors were trapped in debt-ridden Latin
American countries where both the degree and the fluctuation of
inflation increased in the 1980s. The insignificant effect on FDI
of structural and sectoral adjustment programs financed by the
World Bank (SSL) indicates that foreign investors were rather
sceptical as concerns the credibility and sustainability of such
programs.
Since the early 1980s, foreign investors could also be expected
to account for risks originating from impaired ability or unwil-
lingness of developing countries to service external obligations.
Similar to external debt, the profitability of new FDI may be
2
affected by a debt overhang. The expected income from productive
investment which remains with the foreign investor is likely to
decline due to higher expected taxes (in order to service the
inherited debt) [SACHS, 1989] and stagnating markets. Under such
conditions, investors actually refrained from productive invest-
ment. The degree of the debt overhang, reflected in low values of
4
the respective variable DII, was strongly and negatively related
to FDI (Section C, Table 4).
It can be concluded that, on average, foreign investors and
foreign creditors responded in a similar way to debt problems in
1 This corresponds to the results of SCHNEIDER, FREY [1985] and
GOLDBERG [1972] .
2
A debt-overhang situation prevails if the inherited debt is
sufficiently large that creditors do not expect with confidence
to be fully repaid.
3 For a different view, see KRUEGER [1989].
4
Changes in the Institutional Investor magazine's country credit
rating since 1980 (DII) were used as a proxy for the existing
debt overhang. Gross domestic product (GDP) was used as a con-
trolling variable.- 30 -
developing countries, namely by limiting their engagement. This
result is most relevant for debt-ridden Latin American economies.
Parallel behaviour of foreign capital providers renders it ex-
tremely difficult for these countries to change their external
financing structure in favour of FDI unless debt problems are
overcome. According to the above estimates, earlier proposals to
replace debt by FDI - and thereby reduce debt problems - were
based on rather naive (implicit) assumptions on the substitut-
ability of different types of private capital transfers.
Similarities between the behaviour of foreign investors and cre-
ditors could also be expected with regard to sovereign risk.
Sovereign countries may not only default an external debt, but
may also benefit from expropriation of foreign investments and
2
from imposing restrictions on profit and capital remittances.
Such risks can be supposed to be higher (and, thus, the flow of
FDI to be lower), the more resources host countries may save by
imposing sovereign measures on FDI. Section D of Table 4 reveals
that potential benefits from sovereign measures against FDI -
proxied by the ratio of FDI stocks over GDP (BENST) - clearly
discouraged further inflows for countries with restrictive FDI
regulations. By contrast, high FDI stocks induced even more FDI
flows to countries with favourable attitudes towards FDI. The
latter result indicates that a liberal treatment of FDI and a co-
operative stance of host countries towards foreign investors
helps to enhance the attractiveness for FDI through reputation
building.
All in all, the empirical results lead to the conclusion that FDI
flows can no longer be explained exclusively by traditional vari-
For the discussion of sovereign risk in the case of foreign
debt, see Section II.1.a above.
2
This is to be expected for unspecific, i.e. broadly based,
expropriations in the first place, whereas specific expropri-
ations depend on firm- or industry-specific factors [see PICHT,
STUVEN, 1988].
For further sovereign risk variables, see Appendix II and the
detailed discussion in AGARWAL et al. [1991]. As most of these
variables turned out to be of limited impact, the results are
not presented here.- 31 -
ables like domestic market size and real economic growth. Foreign
investors appear to be well aware of restrictive regulations and
the riskiness of their transfers due to political instability, a
considerable debt overhang, and the threat of sovereign measures
of host countries. Hence, two conditions have to be fulfilled if
substantial new FDI inflows are to be attracted. First, macro-
economic reforms are required in order to improve the general
economic policy framework and the ability to service external
obligations. Additionally, restrictive regulations have to be
abolished to provide clear signals for foreign investors, who
appear to be mainly concerned about sovereign risk in host coun-
tries with an interventionist tradition with respect to FDI poli-
cies.
c. Government Interventions and the Efficiency of Debt and FDI
Inflows
As argued above, the chances of debt-ridden developing countries
to restructure their external financing are limited at best,
unless transfer risks are reduced for both foreign creditors and
investors. Several countries have attempted to overcome this
dilemma by implementing debt-equity swap programs. It is heavily
debated in the literature whether such (frequently costly) promo-
tion schemes have resulted in additional FDI inflows. BERGSMAN
and EDISIS [1988] found that Western commercial banks as direct
investors in developing countries brought additional FDI when
they converted their debt claims into equity capital. But in the
case of other multinational corporations this is more doubtful.
On an aggregate basis, the extremely high ratios of authorized
debt-equity swaps to total FDI inflows point to substantial dis-
placement effects, i.e., FDI undertaken in the context of swaps
would have been undertaken anyway.
This ratio amounted to 0.96 in the case of Argentina. It even
exceeded unity in the case of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, which
is partly because the figures on authorized swaps and FDI
transactions are not strictly comparable [AGARWAL et al., 1991,
p. 112]. For the displacement effects in the case of Chile, see
FFRENCH-DAVIS [1990]. Additionally, negative effects on either
inflation or domestic capital markets are to be expected, de-
pending on the financing of the swaps (see e.g. KUME, ITO
[1989]).- 32 -
Moreover, the economic performance effects of financial re-
structuring remain uncertain in the presence of government re-
strictions that hinder an efficient use of debt and FDI inflows.
Typically, FDI is considered superior to debt (in terms of growth
and investment effects) because managerial skills and techno-
logical know-how are transfered in addition to foreign finance
[WORLD BANK, a, 1985; PICHT, 1987a]. Moreover, FDI provides for
risk-sharing with foreign investors, in contrast to debt which is
characterized by fixed repayment schedules. Empirically, however,
the perceived superiority of FDI is less straightforward. Evi-
dence from cross-country regressions [LACHLER, NUNNENKAMP,
1987] , performed for 36 developing countries and the period
before the outbreak of the debt crisis, reveals that the invest-
ment and growth effects of FDI did not exceed those of debt
(Table 5). The impact of debt on economic growth was even signif-
2
icantly higher relative to FDI. The hypothesis of a general
superiority of FDI over debt has, therefore, to be rejected.
Table 5 - Impact of Capital Flows on Investment and Economic




























































All estimates were made by ordinary least square methods.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. SSR denotes the sum
of squared residuals. For detailed definitions of variables,
see Appendix II.
Source: LACHLER, NUNNENKAMP [1987].
The distinction between debt and FDI inflows, which is of in-
terest here, was largely neglected in other empirical studies.
For exceptions, see FEDER, REGEV [1985], and HANSON [1974].
A standard F-test procedure was used to test the proposition of
different coefficient values, by imposing pair-wise restric-
tions on the parameter values (results not shown here).- 33 -
This somewhat surprising result can be attributed to two types of
government interventions: (1) moral-hazard behaviour by the reci-
pient country due to time-inconsistency problems and resulting in
non-cooperative transfer negotiations, and (2) measures which
interfere with an efficient use of the transfered resources. Time
inconsistency may affect the effectiveness of FDI in the first
place. As argued by LA.CHLER [1985], the capital recipient has an
ex-post incentive to invest a smaller proportion of available
funds once FDI transfers have taken place. This is because a
fixed share of the expected marginal investment returns accrues
to the foreign investor. In particular, the incentive to under-
take public investments that are complementary to FDI inflows is
weakened, since alternative uses of the resources increase the
share of expected returns that remains with the capital reci-
pient. Only a credible commitment not to reduce domestic invest-
ment efforts ex post would rule out moral hazard and result in
cooperative transfer relations.
Time-series regressions for Chile and Mexico provided some
support for this theoretical argument (for details, see CORSEPIUS
et al. [1989]). They underlined the importance of the type of
transfer relations in determining the relative performance
effects of FDI and debt. In Chile, the correlation between FDI
inflows and public investment was found to be negative, indica-
ting non-cooperative transfer relations. Accordingly, FDI had a
lower impact on overall investment relative to debt (results not
shown here). On the other hand, Mexico apparently succeeded to
engage in cooperative transfer relations. Public investment in
Mexico responded positively to FDI inflows and, consequently, the
investment effect of FDI significantly exceeded that one of debt.
Particularly the economic growth effects of capital inflows de-
pended on government regulations on the use of the transfered
resources. This is evident from detailed country studies on
Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and South Korea [CORSEPIUS, 1988a; 1988b;
SCHWEICKERT, 1991; NUNNENKAMP, 1989]. The efficiency of debt
inflows was impaired in more or less the same way in the four- 34 -
sample economies. Repayment guarantees of the government and
artificially reduced borrowing costs weakened the incentive of
borrowers to scrutinize the profitability of investment projects.
A selective allocation of foreign loans frequently prevented that
foreign resources were put into their most productive use. Simi-
larly, selective and discriminating approval procedures, as well
as restrictive local participation rules tended to affect the
efficiency of FDI inflows negatively. But differences in the
regulation of FDI were much more pronounced among the sample
countries than in the case of external debt: FDI regulations were
most restrictive in Mexico and South Korea, significantly less so
in Malaysia, and fairly liberal in Chile. This explains why the
difference between the economic growth impact of FDI and debt was
significantly positive in Chile, somewhat less pronounced in
Malaysia, and insignificant in Mexico and South Korea (results
not shown).
In judging on the relative merits and disadvantages of FDI and
debt, it is thus crucially important to consider the instituti-
onal and regulatory framework governing different capital trans-
fers in the country in question. The empirical analyses do not
support the widely held belief that financial restructuring in
favour of FDI per se provides an easy way out of the economic
difficulties of credit constrained countries. Typically, over-
indebted countries are also constrained in terms of FDI. More-
over, the economic performance effects of financial restructuring
remain uncertain at best, unless time-inconsistency problems are
contained and the incentives for an efficient use of external
resources are strengthened.
d. Conclusions on Domestic Policy Choices
The above discussion suggests that there is considerable scope to
improve a country's attractiveness for foreign capital and to
enhance the efficiency of both debt and FDI inflows. Internal
adjustment efforts are absolutely necessary to regain access to
foreign risk capital. The design and implementation of comprehen-
sive and consistent reform packages cannot be discussed in detail- 35 -
here. However, it is noteworthy that a far-reaching consensus has
emerged in recent years as concerns important ingredients of
promising adjustment programs. The subsequent summary focuses on
major policy instruments available to reform-minded governments
(for a detailed discussion, see e.g. WILLIAMSON [1990]):
- Large and sustained fiscal deficits are a primary source of
macroeconomic instability. The restoration of fiscal discipline
is, therefore, urgently required.
- A critical review of public expenditure priorities may help to
enhance the economic growth effects of government spending. For
example, public spending should be switched from subsidies and
military expenditures to education and health as well as com-
plementary investment in infrastructure.
- Tax reform is required to contain fiscal deficits and provide
the state with adequate resources. Most importantly, the tax
base should be broad and tax evasion must be prevented by an
improved tax administration and enforcement.
- In the context of financial market liberalization, selective
credit allocation should be discontinued; and real interest
rates should be positive in order to discourage capital flight
and increase domestic savings.
- The stimulation of exports, in particular non-traditional ex-
ports, requires a competitive exchange rate and the stabiliza-
tion of excessively volatile real exchange rates.
- Import liberalization constitutes another element of an out-
ward- and efficiency-oriented economic policy framework. First
of all, quantitative import restrictions should be abolished.
They may be replaced by tariffs in a first step.
More specifically, a critical review of debt and FDI policies may
help to ensure an efficient use of both types of external fi-
nance. As concerns FDI, the degree of foreign ownership should
not be unduly restricted. Otherwise the growth-enhancing transfer
of technological and managerial skills is likely to suffer. Se-
lective approval procedures should be abolished as far as- 36 -
possible. FDI should also be allowed in activities where domestic
firms are engaged. This would add to efficiency-increasing compe-
titive pressures. Foreign investors should not be isolated from
competition either. Entry barriers for competing enterprises must
be relaxed to encourage an efficient use of FDI. Import protec-
tion granted to approved foreign investors should be phased out.
In this way, the risk would be reduced that FDI is confined to
sectors in the production of which the capital-recipient country
has no comparative advantages.
As concerns debt inflows, selective and discriminating debt-allo-
cation policies must be revised in order to translate the invest-
ment effects into favourable economic growth effects. Heavy and
human-capital intensive industries that are not in line with the
capital-recipient country's comparative advantage should not be
granted preferential access to foreign loans. The chances that
foreign loans flow to the most productive use would be further
improved if (1) the subsidization of foreign borrowing was dis-
continued, (2) an overvaluation of domestic currencies was
avoided, and (3) public bail-outs of defaulting private debtors
were no longer granted.
The recent priority on financial restructuring is mistaken if
considered as an alternative to revise economic policies that
gave rise to the unproductive use of foreign capital of various
types. Attempts to attract FDI by offering subsidies to foreign
investors (e.g. tax and tariff exemptions, as well as generous
discounts in the context of swap operations), while at the same
time maintaining constraining regulations, are likely to fail. It
appears more promising to adhere to the rule: "what is good poli-
cy for domestic investors is also good for foreign investors",
i.e., to create a stable and favourable general framework for
investment and to keep ad-hoc interventions to the minimum. Fur-
thermore, it is not only the rules and regulations that matter,
but also how they are applied in practice. Most notably, the
approval procedure should be fast and transparent.- 37 -
It may take considerable time to restore the confidence of -
foreign and domestic - investors once the credibility of govern-
ments has been substantially eroded. During this transition
period, the subsidization of FDI may be justified, unless this is
regarded as a substitute for economic policy reform. In order to
avoid a waste of public resources, the subsidization must be
limited to the degree which is necessary to compensate for in-
creased risk in the transition period. This may be achieved,
e.g., by introducing auction mechanisms into debt-equity swap
operations. Similar incentives should be granted to domestic in-
vestors . In this way, distortions due to unfair competition be-
tween foreign and domestic investors could be avoided.
Beyond these short-term considerations, developing countries are
well advised to build up a reputation as cooperative borrowers
and cooperative hosts of FDI. Otherwise the chances to regain
access to private capital transfers at favourable conditions
appear to be fairly remote, particularly for many Latin American
countries. It appears not very promising to press hard for fur-
2
ther debt-service concessions. The reluctance of foreign capital
providers to maintain, not to speak of increasing, their engage-
ment is likely to mount in the case of repeated and protracted
debt renegotiations which create considerable uncertainties as to
the timing and final outcome. Creditor-debtor confrontation will
not only impair the chances for renewed private lending, but is
also likely to have adverse implications on other forms of capi-
tal inflows such as FDI [EL-ERIAN, 1991].
Towards improving perceptions of country risk, policy-induced
bottlenecks that impede a successful mobilization of domestic
savings should be removed, complementary public investments main-
In this way, a market-based determination of redemption prices
of debt paper could be ensured.
2
Especially for Latin America, the reversal of capital flows
since 1982 was hardly due to higher debt-service payments.
Negative net transfers were rather caused by drastically re-
duced inflows of new bank credits (see Table II.4 in Appendix I
and NUNNENKAMP [1988]).- 38 -
tained and expanded, and the widespread bias in favour of high-
risk projects reduced. Especially a world-market oriented de-
velopment approach provides a clear signal that cooperative
transfer relations are aimed at. Such a strategy limits the
transfer risk of foreign capital providers, since export earnings
are generated out of which external payment obligations could be
serviced.
Furthermore, the above discussion suggests that economic adjust-
ment programs have to be supplemented by policy measures that
help to overcome credibility problems, which again relates to
Latin America in the first place. Such measures should aim at
reducing the considerable uncertainties foreign creditors and
investors are presently facing whether governments will stick to
a preannounced economic policy course. In this respect, it would
be helpful if policy makers in capital-recipient countries were
prepared to "tie their own hands" (on the following, see CALVO,
FRENKEL [1992]). This may be achieved in various ways: First, the
early steps of an economic reform program must be significant to
signal the commitment of the government. Policy pronouncements
accompanied by concrete actions, the reversal of which would be
politically costly, are most helpful in this context. The higher
the political costs of policy reversal, the higher the credibili-
ty of policy pronouncements and the lower the weight given by
foreign capital providers to past policy failures•
Secondly, the policy-making apparatus should be designed in a way
as to provide effective checks and balances in order to reduce
time-inconsistency problems. An example for such internal legal
constraints on ad-hoc interventions by the government is the
establishment of an independent central bank. Thirdly, external
legal constraints may be imposed on the government by entering
into international agreements, e.g. by joining the GATT and com-
plying to its rules. Fourthly, credibility may be enhanced by
adopting an economic program that is supported by an internati-
onal financial institution, i.e., by receiving the endorsement of
independent experts, and by agreeing to the conditionality which- 39 -
is typically associated with international financial support of
reform programs. Of course, these methods to tie the government's
hands are not mutually exclusive, but may rather reinforce each
other in overcoming credibility problems.
2. Changes in the International Economic Environment and the
Developing Countries' Attractiveness for Foreign Capital
It has been argued above that there is considerable room for
domestic policy makers to overcome the currently prevailing "per-
verse" situation of capital-exporting developing countries. It
may be objected, however, that costly adjustment efforts will
largely remain useless in view of the widespread concern about
the adequacy of global savings and their distribution. Unfavour-
able international capital-market conditions may indeed render it
even more difficult for traditional capital recipients to attract
foreign capital in the future.
Global savings have emerged as a major issue of concern in the
last few years. First of all, this is due to the fact that nati-
onal savings have declined in virtually all OECD countries (for a
detailed discussion, see DEAN [1991]). Moreover, the United
States have absorbed considerable savings from abroad since the
emergence of huge budget deficits - and are still doing so. At
the beginning of the 1990s, global competition for international-
ly mobile risk capital has further intensified. OECD countries'
savings have increasingly been used domestically, most notably in
Germany after unification. The completion of the European inter-
nal market may negatively affect other countries' relative loca-
tional advantages for international investors. And, finally,
fresh demand for foreign capital has evolved in Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union.
The topical question, to be shortly discussed subsequently, is
whether developing countries can stand this fiercer competition
for foreign capital, or whether they will be pushed onto the
sidelines irrespective of the degree of domestic adjustment- 40 -
efforts. The basic arguments may be exemplified by refering to
the possible consequences of Western European integration (EC
1992) and the radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe after
the collapse of the socialist regime. Both developments will
effect far-reaching changes in the world economy (for a broader
discussion, see e.g. HIEMENZ [1991]; NUNNENKAMP [1991]). As con-
cerns international capital transfers, private capital in the
form of bank loans and direct investment could be increasingly
diverted from developing countries and concentrated in Europe. It
would certainly be wrong to dismiss such fears out of hand. How-
ever, on closer inspection they prove to be undifferentiated and
solely concentrated on the risks involved.
EC 1992: Any analysis of the effects of the EC-1992 program on
developing countries at this stage is bound to be conjectural.
The question of the EC's relations with the outside world is
still unresolved to a significant extent. Investment flows will
partly depend on whether the EC will look like a "fortress" for
third countries or be a liberal trading partner. In any event,
however, the EC has become an attractive location for foreign
capital, which may indirectly affect the relative competitive
position of developing countries (see also HIEMENZ et al.
[1992]):
- Foreign investors may increasingly concentrate their activities
on the EC and cut back on their engagement in other regions.
- In particular, investment may be relocated to the EC periphery
because EC members such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece
have a factor endowment similar to many developing countries.
Such risks should not be overrated, though. First, FDI in de-
veloping countries is still focused on the manufacturing sector,
while FDI in the EC is increasingly shifting to the service sec-
tor. The significant differences in the sectoral distribution of
FDI limit the adverse effects of higher FDI in the EC on FDI
flows to the Third World. Secondly, most of the larger multinati-
onal enterprises have already adjusted their portfolios to the
EC-1992 program so that the future impact may not be as great- 41 -
[GITTELMAN, 1990]. Third, a relocation of investment to the bene-
fit of countries such as Spain and Portugal would quickly be
countered by rapidly increasing wage costs on the EC periphery as
a result of the "Social Charter" of the Community. The same
applies in the case of a revaluation of the currencies of the
capital-importing EC countries, something which these countries
would be very unlikely to be able to avoid, once they are fully
integrated into the envisaged European Monetary Union.
Finally, the structural change which the removal of barriers to
the free movement of goods and production factors will induce
within the EC offers the opportunity for higher economic growth
well into the 1990s. This would not only increase the EC's demand
for imports from developing countries, but also the financial
resources of the member countries available for capital transfers
to developing countries. Such positive aspects of the EC-1992
program are often ignored in the current discussion.
The risks inherent in the EC-1992 program will probably affect
the developing countries to different degrees. Similarly, only
some of these countries will be able to grasp the opportunities
offered by EC 1992. In view of the strong relation between trade
and FDI (see also Section Il.l.b), primarily the developing coun-
tries that are integrated into the international division of
labour, and on which the EC's additional import demand will be
concentrated, might benefit from larger FDI inflows. This may
pose many Latin American countries at a serious disadvantage as
compared to their competitors in East and Southeast Asia, unless
the former open up towards world markets.
Eastern Europe; Similar conclusions probably apply with respect
to the effects of the reforms in post-socialist countries on the
developing countries. It is true that Western donors are pre-
Again an analytically sound assessment is hardly possible at
the present stage; on first attempts in this direction, see
OECD [1990].- 42 -
pared to give considerable financial support to the reform pro-
cess in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the risks for developing
countries are kept within reasonable bounds, given the consider-
able transformation problems in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely
that creditworthy developing countries will be squeezed out of
the international capital market as a consequence of the emerging
demand for private capital in post-socialist countries. There are
tight limits on the access to international capital markets of
East European reforming countries because of their existing high
indebtedness in hard currency. Furthermore, the absorptive capa-
city for foreign capital in Eastern Europe is constrained in the
short term by administrative bottlenecks, remaining ambiguity
concerning property rights, etc.
There is no reason to believe that there will be a massive shift
of FDI from the developing countries to Eastern Europe [UNIDO,
1990, p. 15]. In view of the infrastructural decay and the above
mentioned bottlenecks, it is extremely doubtful that there will
be an immediate FDI boom in the post-socialist countries. Even if
this were to happen, it is unlikely that foreign investors would
relinquish attractive locations in the Third World. First evi-
dence suggests that future investment in Eastern Europe will be
motivated primarily by the intention to penetrate the respective
national markets, rather than serving as a platform for exports.
Consequently, developing countries with growing domestic markets
and cost advantages for export-oriented direct investment are
unlikely to be negatively affected. The latter may rather benefit
from new market opportunities in Eastern Europe. Again, risks and
chances are unevenly distributed among developing countries.
Recent attempts by European, and particularly German, companies
to intensify their involvement in Asian developing countries,
where they are currently underrepresented in comparison to their
American and Japanese competitors [AGARWAL, 1988], are likely to
continue, notwithstanding the developments in Eastern Europe. By
contrast, it may become more difficult for Latin American econo-
mies to attract further domestic-market oriented FDI from Europe.- 43 -
To summarize, the major changes in the international economic
environment must not necessarily impair capital flows to de-
veloping countries. But the fiercer competition for foreign capi-
tal will, in all probability, lead to a further differentiation
of the Third World. Far Eastern countries have implemented fairly
liberal investment policies,- opened up to world markets, and have
become successful suppliers of manufactured exports. Moreover,
they are expected to achieve relatively high growth rates of
their GDP due to sound macroeconomic policies. As shown above,
these are major determinants of the attractiveness for foreign
capital. Hence, these countries will be able to maintain their
competitive position, if not indeed improve upon it, as the anti-
cipated changes in the world economy create more opportunities
than risks for them.
The prospects of Latin America are more ambiguous. The negative
impact of economic policy failures on their relative competitive
position will probably become even stronger than in the past.
Hence, they will maintain, or even raise, their share of capital
flows from industrialized countries only through successful sta-
bilization, structural reforms and restoring credibility. The
intensified worldwide competition for foreign capital requires
immediate action by developing countries with impaired attrac-
tiveness for foreign capital.
Ill. Brazil's Position in the International Competition for
Foreign Capital
1. Impaired Attractiveness for Foreign Capital
Until the early 1980s, foreign investors and creditors were eager
to engage in Brazil in order to participate in the "Brazilian
Economic Miracle" of high growth and booming exports. The large
though untapped domestic market as well as the country's endow-
ment with vast natural resources and semi-skilled labour offered
favourable profit opportunities. Consequently, foreign loans were- 44 -
easily available, and the country was considered a priority loca-
tion for FDI.
The situation has changed fundamentally in the 1980s. With the
eruption of the debt crisis, it became evident that the domestic
market potential as well as the availability of natural resources
and labour were insufficient ingredients to guarantee high re-
turns on investment in the longer run. External shocks and mis-
guided economic policies rendered it difficult to sustain the
impressive growth of per-capita income and exports of the 1970s.
Foreign investors and creditors became increasingly reluctant to
transfer further capital to Brazil.
The change in perceptions is most dramatically reflected by the
deterioration of Brazil's international creditworthiness. Second-
ary market prices for Brazilian debt, which were still at a level
of 75 per cent of face value in 1986, declined steadily to a
bottom value of only 22 per cent at the end of 1989 (Table V.2,
Appendix I); the subsequent slight recovery (32 per cent in mid-
1991) did not prevent that Brazil was among the debtor countries
with the highest secondary market discounts in 1991. In the 1982-
1989 period, the country suffered from negative net transfers of
about US$ 32 billion as a consequence of sharply reduced bank
lending (Table II.4). In addition, annual FDI inflows (reinvest-
ment included) dwindled from US$ 2.7 billion in 1982 to US$ 0.35
billion in 1986 (Table III.4). The temporary recovery of FDI in
1987-1989 was largely due to debt conversions. In 1990, FDI
inflows amounted to less than 18 per cent of 1982-flows.
2. Strategic Choices
The Brazilian government has basically three options to deal with
the current situation of impaired attractiveness for foreign
capital. The first option follows from the proposition of some
1988 was a record year for debt-swap operations. Altogether US$
6.7 billion worth of debt was eliminated in this year. The pace
of debt-equity swaps slowed considerably in 1989 [EIU, a, No.
4, 1989, p. 14]. See also PORST [1991, pp. 68f.].- 45 -
observers that, from now on, Brazil should exclusively rely on
internal resources to finance necessary investments. This would
imply a deliberate isolation from international capital markets,
based on the overly pessimistic assumption that any attempt of
Brazil to regain access to foreign investment funds is bound to
fail. Ultimately, this proposition implies that Brazil should
repudiate all its foreign payment obligations. It would not make
sense to transfer any debt-service payments if it were unreason-
able to expect any benefits from such a behaviour, e.g. in terms
of renewed lending by foreign private creditors.
The critical question is whether the assumptions underlying this
first option are valid. This is extremely unlikely to be the
case. Notwithstanding the recent progress in raising national
2
savings, an exclusive reliance on internal resources will, in
all probability, result in a low-growth scenario. Savings in
Brazil are extremely short term, due to inflationary expectations
and a more general lack of confidence as regards government poli-
cies. They can hardly be used to finance longer-term investment
projects. With time deposits of 30 days and more being the excep-
tion, it is virtually impossible for financial intermediaries to
extend medium- and long-term credits in national currency (see
also PORST [1991, pp. 136ff.]). Moreover, a deliberate isolation
from international capital markets by repudiating external debt
is going to add to the adjustment costs to be borne internally.
This argument would hold even if it were true that the honouring
of contractual debt obligations does not induce new bank lending
in the short run. The government's stance towards the foreign
debt issue is also relevant with respect to other types of exter-
nal finance. Debtor countries following the first option will not
get financial assistance from the international financial insti-
tutions. As shown above, further FDI inflows are also discouraged
For example, US-professor Jeffrey SACHS adhered to such a posi-
tion at a conference held in Sao Paulo in 1989.
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According to IBGE-data, gross savings increased from the bottom
figure of 13.3 per cent of GNP in 1983 to an average figure of
about 23 per cent in 1987-1990.- 46 -
by debtor-creditor confrontation. Reduced FDI inflows, in turn,
render it increasingly difficult to modernize the capital stock
and, thereby, improve labour productivity and international com-
petitiveness. The growth prospects will be further impaired if
domestic investors react to non-cooperative debt policies in a
similar way as foreign investors, i.e. by transfering their capi-
tal abroad rather than investing at home (capital flight). The
fact that capital flight is mainly to be observed in countries
with impaired attractiveness for foreign capital strongly
suggests that such parallel behaviour is likely to happen.
The significant risk of a shortage of investment funds has pre-
vented most governments from opting for outright debt repudi-
ation. Also Brazil rather followed the second option of partial
default, temporary and unilateral debt-service moratoria, and
protracted debt renegotiations with its foreign creditors. As a
result, the country ran considerable interest arrears on commer-
cial bank debt (March 1990: US$ 5.3 billion [INSTITUTE OF INTER-
NATIONAL FINANCE, 1990]; end-1990: US$ 8.4 billion [EIU, a, No.
1, 1991]). Underlying is the agreement among Brazilian politici-
ans that if they had to choose between paying the external debt
and domestic economic growth, they would choose to grow. However,
it is highly doubtful whether there is such a simple choice,
especially if it is true that foreign capital continues to be
required to fully exhaust the country's growth potential.
Brazil represents a telling example of negative net transfers
(out of bank loans) being due to reduced credit disbursements,
rather than a higher debt-service burden (Table II.4). Actual
annual debt-service payments (interest and amortization) in the
period 1985-1989 amounted, on average, to less than half the
1982-figure. At the same time, credit disbursements virtually
dried up. A further reduction of debt-service payments - achieved
by unilateral action or by using the threat of unilateral action
to enforce creditor concessions - would, of course, save the
country resources which could be invested. However, the overall
effects of this option on total investment funds and, thereby, on- 47 -
the medium-term growth prospects are probably not too different
from outright debt repudiation:
- Brazil might be cut off from international bank lending for
long, after credit losses have been realized by its creditors.
Any defensive lending would be discontinued, since the incen-
tives of creditors to protect outstanding claims through addi-
tional loans are further weakened by non-cooperative debt poli-
cies .
- As in the case of debt repudiation, the adverse effects of
non-cooperative debt policies are not confined to Brazil's
relations with foreign commercial banks. Foreign investment
would be discouraged as well, and creditor governments as well
as international financial institutions would hardly be willing
to grant official financial assistance under conditions of
persistent debtor-creditor confrontation.
- Finally, it remains highly doubtful whether any domestic re-
sources retained through partial default will be invested pro-
ductively, unless the general investment climate is improved.
Under prevailing economic policy conditions, they may rather be
2 used for consumption or fuel capital flight.
The critical assessment of unilaterally enforced debt-service
reduction does not rule out mutually agreed debt concessions. A
reduction of contractual obligations would trigger an investment
response that is in excess of that which would result solely from
the larger domestic availability of resources under the second
option, once the perceptions of country risk are lowered [EL-
ERIAN, 1991, p. 5]. Hence, the third option of Brazil requires a
two-sided approach, whereby the implementation of sound economic
For example, the IMF was believed to have reached an agreement
with Brazil in September 1990 on an economic program which the
Fund was willing to support with a stand-by loan of some US$ 2
billion. However, Brazil's interest arrears acted as a barrier
to the signing of the program [EIU, a, No. 1, 1991, p. 28].
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It has been estimated that Brazil's unreported foreign assets
amount to about one third of the country's external debt
[PORST, 1991, p. 72].- 48 -
policies by the Brazilian government would be supported by volun-
tary and market-based debt and debt-service reduction operations.
The third option implies that debt negotiations take place on the
basis of a consistent and mutually agreed macroeconomic frame-
work. In particular, a cooperative debt strategy has to take into
account that Brazil's foreign debt problem is to a large extent a
fiscal problem, i.e. a problem of an overindebted government. The
concept of the public sector's fiscal payment capacity is of
relevance here (for a detailed discussion, see OHANA, MUSSI
[1991]). A sustainable balance has to be struck between revenue-
increasing measures (e.g. improved tax collection), cuts in un-
productive government expenditures, basic public investment re-
quirements, and debt-service payments. Brazil and its creditors
may refer to a third party, e.g. the IMF, as a mediator to reach
an agreement on measures which may strengthen the government's
payment capacity on the one hand, and on creditor concessions
allowing for growth-oriented public investment and fiscal con-
solidation during the difficult transition period on the other
hand.
The experiences of Chile and Mexico point to major advantages of
a cooperative approach towards solving foreign debt problems
[EL-ERIAN, 1991]:
- Through a menu of market-based debt operations, these countries
succeeded to alleviate their debt burden substantially.
- Debt-overhang concerns of foreign capital providers were re-
duced. Secondary market discounts fell to about 10 per cent in
the case of Chile, while secondary market prices for bank
claims on Mexico improved from less than 40 per cent of face
value in 1989 to 55 per cent in mid-1991 (Table V.2).
This menu included voluntary market-based debt-equity conver-
sions, direct cash buybacks, conversions of debt into collate-
ralized discount bonds, reduced interest par bonds, etc. In
this way, Chile reduced its debt to banks by more than half in
four years. Gross bank-debt reduction through conversions into
bonds amounted to US$ 15 billion in the case of Mexico.- 49 -
- International credit rationing has been gradually relaxed.
Spontaneous long-term bank lending is slowly recovering, par-
ticularly in the form of trade and project financing which
Chile, for example, used as the main source of voluntary exter-
nal funding. Recently, there has been a significant increase in
bond activity and FDI.
- Recent estimates suggest a significant repatriation of flight
o
capital, which again points to parallel behaviour of foreign
and domestic investors.
- The share of private investment in GDP increased from the
bottom value of 11 per cent in 1983 to 14.4 per cent in 1989 in
Mexico, and from 4.9 to 15.5 per cent in the case of Chile
[PFEFFERMANN, MADARASSY, 1991].
The restoration of access to voluntary capital-market financing
has clear benefits. Inter alia, it provides a wide and flexible
range of financing instruments to fund productive investment, and
signals reduced credit and transfer risks to economic agents in
other international and domestic markets. The experiences of
Chile and Mexico strongly suggest that market re-entry is a re-
alistic option once the domestic policy framework is improved. In
Brazil, important prerequisites for an improved attractiveness
for foreign capital are still lacking. Most fundamentally, cre-
dibility problems have to be overcome to restore the confidence
of foreign and domestic investors. In this context, the policy
conclusions of Section Il.l.d apply (see also CARNEIRO, WERNECK
[1989]). More specifically, a serious attempt must be made to
tackle the internal bottlenecks to an improved attractiveness for
foreign capital in particular policy areas. The subsequent evalu-
ation of Brazil's relative competitive position shall help to
For example, bond issues by Mexican public and private sector
companies exceeded US$ 1.5 billion in the first five months of
1991. FDI inflows registered in Mexico in 1989-1990 were twice
the level recorded in 1987-1988 [EL-ERIAN, 1991, p. 3].
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A study by Chartered West LB Ltd. estimated net total inflows
of flight capital of US$ 14 billion for Chile, Mexico and Vene-
zuela in 1989-1990 (as compared to outflows of US$ 4.5 billion
in 1987-1988).- 50 -
identify such bottlenecks and provides first clues how to improve
the country's position in worldwide competition for risk capital.
3. The Competitive Position of Brazil: Major Bottlenecks
a. An Overview on Competitiveness
The best known and most comprehensive assessment of international
competitiveness is provided by the annual "World Competitiveness
Reports" compiled by the World Economic Forum in Geneva [WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, a]. The approach adopted is to identify a set of
indicators of international competitiveness and to compare these
indicators across countries. More than 300 indicators are com-
pressed into 10 baskets ranging from the dynamism of the economy
to socio-political stability. About one third of the indicators
is based on "learned judgement", i.e. the opinions of businessmen
and other experts, rather than on hard data.
The World Competitiveness Reports portray the competitive positi-
on of Brazil relative to nine other newly industrializing coun-
tries in Asia and Latin America. An overall picture is provided
by Figure 1. The ranking of part A is calculated according to
standard deviation values of all (quantitative and qualitative)
criteria considered in the report. The relative competitiveness
of Brazil is shown to be extremely poor. Moreover, the country is
the tail-light (and the distance to major competitors is more
pronounced) if the ranking is based solely on qualitative crite-
ria, i.e. expert perceptions on competitive strengths and weak-
nesses (part B).
Table 6 presents the ranking in terms of the 10 principal factors
(baskets) of competitiveness, whereby a rank of "1" ("10") re-
veals the most favourable (unfavourable) position within the
2
sample. In 1990, Brazil was surpassed by all other sample econo-
mies with respect to five principal factors. Its rank position
A separate ranking is provided for 22 developed countries.
2
For 1986 the most unfavourable position is given by "9", since
Indonesia was not included.- 51 -
Table 6 - Rankings on Principal Factors of Competitiveness, 1986 and 1990
Brazil Hong India Indo- Korea, Malay- Mexico Singa- Taiwan Thai-
1986 1990 Kong nesia Rep. sia pore land
Dynamism
of the
economy 8946 8 2 5 10 3 17
Industrial
efficiency 9 10 39 76 5 81 4 2
Market
orientation 7618 95 4 10 2 3 7
Financial
dynamism 6 10 28 64 7 91 3 5
Human
resources 674 10 93 5 81 2 6
Impact of the
state 6 10 18 97 4 52 6 3
Natural
endowment
utilization 2269 37 1 4 10 8 5
International
orientation 982 10 95 6 71 3 4
Future
orientation 5 10 84 93 6 72 1 5
Socio-
political
stability 7 10 29 8 6 3 71 4 5
For explanations, see text. For all countries, except Brazil, only the 1990-
rankings are presented. Rank 1(10) stands for the most (least) competitive
country.
Source: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [a].- 52 -
Figure 1 - The Competitive Position of Brazil vis-a-vis Selected





Source: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [a, 1990].
was only slightly better in most of the remaining areas. More-
over, the country's ranking deteriorated significantly between
1986 and 1990 as concerns financial dynamism, state interference,
future orientation, and socio-political stability.
A closer inspection of individual indicators underlying the prin-
cipal factors of competitiveness provides more detailed insights
on specific adjustment needs in Brazil. Appendix III provides a
list of items in which Brazil's position vis-a-vis its major
competitors was found to be most unfavourable (rank position 8 to
10). It is evident from this list that most of the bottlenecks
towards an improved competitiveness are not exogenous to the
policy-making apparatus, but could be influenced or even removed
by appropriate policy measures.
Not surprisingly, the natural resource endowment provided a
notable exception.- 53 -
Appendix III has to be selective due to the large number of indi-
cators presented in the World Competitiveness Reports. More im-
portantly, the relative weight of different indicators remains
open to question. This renders it difficult to identify those
policy areas that could be of overriding importance if Brazil
were determined to improve its position in the competition for
risk capital. However, a recent study proves to be helpful in
making such a choice [HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al., 1991]. By means
of pooled cross-country regressions, it was found that internati-
onal competitiveness for risk capital can be explained by a
limited set of policy and endowment variables. In particular, the
estimates suggest that macroeconomic instability and policy-
induced distortions of goods and factor markets significantly
reduce the locational advantages of individual countries in the
international competition for investable funds. The subsequent
discussion thus focuses on these policy areas.
b. Macroeconomic Instability
In the above mentioned study of HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al.
[1991], macroeconomic stability was shown to be of crucial im-
portance in determining the overall investment climate in partic-
ular countries. This result is hardly surprising. Fragile macro-
economic conditions give rise to increased uncertainty of poten-
tial investors and their financiers, and render it more difficult
to assess the profitability of longer-term investment and finan-
The relative importance of each basket of indicators and indi-
vidual indicators within each basket - as expressed by the
applied weighting scheme - is assumed by the WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM rather than estimated empirically. Another flaw is that
many indicators are not very precise from an analytical point
of view. There are considerable overlaps between indicators,
and double-counting is due to the fact that the indicators
capture both the causes and effects of competitiveness.- 54 -
cing. Uncertainties may result from instabilities prevailing in
the country's domestic economy and in its international economic
relations. Therefore, indicators of both types of instability
have to be considered. The subsequent variables appear to be most
2
relevant:
- Inflation; High and volatile inflation rates represent an obvi-
ous sign of unsound management of the economy [GREENE, VILLA-
NUEVA, 1991; SCHNEIDER, FREY, 1985].
- Budget deficit; High and rising public deficits fuel inflati-
onary expectations or make private agents anticipate a tighter
credit squeeze and crowding out in the future.
- Foreign debt rescheduling; Reschedulings point to the preva-
lence of a debt overhang. Disincentives for capital inflows and
investment result from the anticipation of private agents that
incremental income will be subject to higher taxation [KRUGMAN,
1988; SACHS, 1989].
- Exchange-rate fluctuation; High volatility of the key price
concerning a country's external relations creates considerable
uncertainties with respect to both trade and capital flows.
The ranking of 26 mainly middle-income developing countries with
respect to the above four indicators reveals Brazil's competitive
position in terms of macroeconomic instability in the second half
of the 1980s (Table 7). Evidently, Brazil was among the most
Additional uncertainty is created in Brazil by the highly com-
plex and sometimes inconsistent regulatory framework. Moreover,
this framework is subject to frequent and erratic changes, and
the outcome of legal decisions is highly uncertain (for de-
tails, see PORST [1991, pp. 78ff.]). As long as uncertainties
remain manageable, higher risk premia will be asked for. Such a
strategy is no longer optimal if uncertainties are becoming
extremely strong. Under such conditions, investors and capital
providers will rather refrain from an engagement altogether or
apply a rationing strategy.
2
For a detailed discussion of the underlying economic rationale
and of additional indicators, see HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al.
[1991, Chapter III] .
For reasons of comparability, Table 7 refers to the period
1985-1988, since more recent data were lacking for several
sample countries.- 55 -
Table 7 - Brazil's Ranking in Terms of Macroeconomic Instability

























































































































































































































































Period averages and ranks; 1(26) is attached to the country with the worst
(highest) attractiveness in terms of the respective indicator. - In per cent
of GDP; positive in the case of surplus. - Average amount of debt resche-
duled in periods t, t-1, and t-2 in per cent of GDP. - Standard deviation of
the real exchange rate over the past five years; low (high) values if ex-
change-rate volatility is above (below) the sample average.
Source: HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al. [1991].- 56 -
unstable sample countries. The country represented the tail-light
as concerns average annual inflation rates and the magnitude of
budget deficits. Taking the four indicators together, Brazil
achieved only 23 out of 97 possible ranking points. In this
respect, only Mexico performed even worse during 1985-1988.
In contrast to Mexico, it is unlikely that the position of Brazil
has improved considerably since the late 1980s. The evidence
rather suggests that macroeconomic instability continued to be a
major problem:
- Notwithstanding periodic price freezes and controls, the annual
average of consumer-price inflation was even higher in 1989-
1990 than before. After the defreezing of prices in mid-1991,
monthly inflation rates again returned quickly to double-digit
levels.
- An astounding turnaround was achieved in the central government
finances. In sharp contrast to the deficit of over 9 per cent
of GDP in the financial year 1989, a surplus of around 1 per
cent of GDP was reported for 1990 [EIU, a, No. 2, 1991, p. 9].
However, this drastic improvement is hardly sustainable since
it was mainly achieved through extraordinary measures and
transitory influences such as the accumulation of arrears on
the external debt and the deferment of payments on the internal
debt (see also OHANA, MUSSI [1991]).
2 No new structural
measures were taken up to mid-1991 to consolidate the fiscal
position. Hence, the EIU estimated a "latent" operational defi-
cit in the order of 4 per cent of GDP.
- In contrast to many debtor countries, Brazil's debt situation
deteriorated further, the huge amount of arrears being the
clearest indication. Another indication is capital flight (con-
servative estimate for 1988: US$ 4 billion [EIU, a, No. 2,
According to EIU [a, No. 3, 1991, p. 3], the annual average
figures amounted to 1287 and 2938 per cent in 1989 and 1990
respectively.
2
Expenditures on federal debt servicing fell by 88 per cent in
real terms; their share in total expenditure fell from 33.8 per
cent to 6.1 per cent [EIU, a, No. 1, 1991, p. 14].- 57 -
1989, p. 5]) through overinvoicing of imports and underin-
voicing of exports, while other debtors succeeded to induce a
reflow of flight capital.
- As concerns exchange-rate volatility, recent evidence suggests
increased rather than reduced instability. The index of the
real effective exchange rate (deflated by wholesale prices)
plummeted from 1988 = 100 to around 50 in March 1990, indi-
cating a drastic real appreciation of the domestic currency.
The subsequent increase to 93 (January 1991) was not sustained
in the next months (March 1991: 78; July 1991: 81 [EIU, a, No.
2, 1991, p. 17 and No. 3, 1991, p. 15].
All in all, macroeconomic instability continues to be a major
stumbling bloc to an improvement of Brazil's attractiveness for
foreign capital. It remains the centerpiece of macroeconomic
reforms to break inflationary expectations. For this end, fiscal
consolidation must be sustainable, i.e. based on a permanent
restructuring of government revenues and expenditures. Success at
the inflation front would also help to stabilize real exchange
rates and, thereby, plug another source of macroeconomic insta-
bility. Without achieving greater macroeconomic stability, the
credibility of any plan towards structural reform is bound to be
seriously eroded (see also CARNEIRO, WERNECK [1989]).
c. Goods Markets Policies
While it is relatively easy to evaluate macroeconomic stability
in a cross-country perspective, it is much more difficult to
construct indicators on policy-induced goods markets distortions,
which could then be compared across countries competing for
foreign capital (for a more detailed discussion, see HIEMENZ,
NUNNENKAMP et al. [1991]). Principally, distortions in both the
domestic and the foreign rate of transformation have to be con-
sidered. They tend to reduce the overall efficiency of production
and, thereby, the expected long-term rate of return to invest-
ment. Hence, a higher degree of policy-induced goods markets
distortions can reasonably be assumed to lead to impaired- 58 -
attractiveness for risk capital, at least in the longer run.
Distortions of the domestic rate of transformation can arise from
discriminatory taxes and subsidies, administrative price fixing,
and similar measures which interfere with the relative profit-
ability of production among sectors. Restrictive entry and exit
regulations (e.g. by nationality), public monopolies and offici-
ally sanctioned cartels may further reduce the locational
advantages of a country for foreign capital. Distortions of the
foreign rate of transformation may be caused by trade policy
interventions such as tariffs, trade taxes and subsidies, quan-
titative controls and other types of non-tariff trade barriers,
as well as state trading. Ample empirical evidence suggests that
excessive trade interventions induce an inefficient use of re-
sources which may ultimately undermine a country's position in
the international competition for risk capital.
The empirical verification of goods markets distortions suffers
from conceptual flaws and data constraints. Therefore, the rela-
tive competitive position of Brazil within the sample of 26 de-
veloping countries has to be interpreted with great care. Inter
alia, the following indicators were considered by HIEMENZ,
NUNNENKAMP et al. [1991]:
- The sum of all indirect taxes levied on goods and services plus
all subsidies (in per cent of government revenues) was taken as
a proxy for the distortionary impact of government interven-
2
tions in domestic prices and protection costs. In the Brazili-
an case, this indicator improved dramatically during the 1980s
so that the country moved from the bottom (1979-1981) to the
top of the sample (1985-1988). As shown below, however, price
The former are due to the fact that distortionary policy inter-
ventions cannot be separated unambiguously from measures that
aim at correcting market imperfections (e.g. externalities).
2
An obvious disadvantage, resulting from data problems, is the
inclusion of non-distortionary taxes such as a uniform value-
added tax.- 59 -
distortions in Brazil are mainly due to non-tax related govern-
ment interventions.
- The share of non-tax revenues (comprising administrative fees
and entrepreneurial income from government property) in total
government revenues was considered to be an indication of ex-
cessive interference of " the government with private sector
activities. In this respect, Brazil ranked among the five least
competitive sample countries throughout the 1980s. However,
non-tax revenues in this country consisted primarily of proper-
ty income from social security funds [IMF, Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook 1990, p. 176], which may or may not deter
private investors.
- The ratio of non-fuel imports to GDP was taken as a measure for
the openness of the sample countries to foreign competition.
With an average ratio of less than 4 per cent in 1985-1988,
Brazil was clearly the least open economy. The low indicator
value for Brazil can at least partly be attributed to a large
country bias.
- By contrast, Brazil would appear to be relatively open if the
degree of trade distortions were approximated by government
revenues derived from trade taxes (in per cent of total govern-
ment revenues). In the case of Brazil, however, the underlying
assumption that tariff revenues and non-tariff interventions
are highly correlated, so that the former provide a correct
measure for openness, is not valid.
The above analysis reveals that the competitive position of
Brazil with respect to goods markets distortions is difficult to
assess in quantitative terms in a cross-country perspective.
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that policy interventions
in goods markets contributed considerably to the country's im-
paired attractiveness for foreign capital. The broader approach
adopted by the WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [a], which also includes the
qualitative assessments of experts, clearly points to competitive
disadvantages of Brazil vis-a-vis nine major competitors. State
intervention is considered to be most pervasive in Brazil, and- 60 -
international orientation is revealed to be weaker only in India
and Indonesia (Table 6). More specifically, the ranking of Brazil
is extremely unfavourable as regards particular indicators of
goods markets distortions (see Appendix III). Most noteworthy
are: entry regulations resulting in oligopolistic market struc-
tures (see also PORST [1991, p. 53]), price regulations, unequal
fiscal treatment among enterprises, high trade barriers and re-
strictive local-content requirements.
Further evidence on policy-induced goods markets distortions has
been presented in country-specific analyses (see e.g. EIU [a,
var. iss.]; CARNEIRO, WERNECK [1989]; PORST [1991]). According to
CARNEIRO, WERNECK [1989], 3-4 per cent of GDP was transfered each
year to the private sector in the form of government expenditures
or forgone revenue during the 1980s. To a large degree, these
transfers were selective and discriminatory. Examples were the
plethora of fiscal exemptions, as well as cheap inputs and
special credit facilities for so-called priority sectors. The
applied import-substitution strategy "implied the choice of se-
lected capitalists which were eligible to receive substantial
transfers from the public vaults. In return, the level of direct
bureaucratic controls over imports, prices and export permits has
probably never been so high and widespread in the Brazilian eco-
nomy" [ibid, pp. 26f.].
More recently, some goods markets distortions were relaxed while
the government continued to resort to periodic domestic price
controls. Since the late 1980s, the government has lowered import
tariffs quite considerably (most notably for industrial inputs).
The number of prohibited import items has been reduced, quantita-
tive restrictions have been relaxed, financing restrictions on
capital goods imports have been removed, and selective export
incentives (BEFIEX) have been phased out. Most importantly, the
extensive system of discretionary and non-tariff barriers has
been tackled. These measures were certainly steps in the right
An important administrative change was the abolition of CACEX
in 1990, which may have reduced uncertainties about the future
course of foreign trade policy.- 61 -
direction, i.e. to improve the Brazilian industry's competitive-
ness by helping it to lower production costs. However, the sus-
tainability of trade liberalization is open to question as long
as the domestic currency is overvalued in real terms, thereby
putting considerable pressure on the balance of payments. Sub-
stantial exchange-rate overvaluation was observed e.g. in the
last quarter of 1989 and the first quarter of 1990 [EIU, a, var.
iss. ] .
Interventionist price policies persisted, however, at the in-
ternal front. The Summer Plan of early 1989 represented another
attempt to tackle run-away inflation through a freeze on the
prices of 180 basic products. Again, serious price distortions
emerged, combined with speculative buying and hoarding. Erratic
2
price-policy changes continued into the Collor-administration.
Although formal price controls were removed in 1990, prices re-
mained policed with hundreds of companies being forced to submit
monthly reports on production costs and prices, and the govern-
ment being committed to prevent "abusive" pricing [EIU, a, No. 3,
1990, p. 9]. In another abrupt change of course, the government
adopted a new price freeze in early 1991 (the fifth since 1986)
after inflation had soared and attempts to form a social pact
(Entendimento Nacional) had failed.
Arguably, the latest price freeze has not been used as a sub-
stitute for serious reforms, as in the case of former freezes
[EIU, a, No. 1, 1991, p. 10]. As shown above, some of the major
causes of persistent inflation have indeed been tackled through
fiscal restraint, deregulation and trade liberalization. However,
double-digit monthly inflation returned after the defreezing of
prices, and already in August 1991 there were rumours of a new
shock plan. This indicates that there is still a serious lack of
The exchange rate was freed in March 1990. In the presence of
foreign exchange controls, however, this is only a first step
towards undistorted exchange rates.
2
For example, direction was changed and price controls were
removed in July 1990, after it had been announced in March that
maximum price increases would be set for each month.- 62 -
credibility and consistency of Brazilian economic policies.
Credibility problems arise, for example, because the fiscal con-
solidation is regarded unsustainable by economic agents (see also
Section lll.3.b). Moreover, attempts of far-reaching trade
liberalization are undermined unless a consistent exchange-rate
policy allows for competitive real exchange rates. In other
words, sustainable macro stabilization and consistent structural
reforms have to go hand in hand in order to restore the confi-
dence of private agents in general, and the attractiveness for
foreign capital in particular.
d. Factor Market Conditions
Another major factor impacting on a country's competitive posi-
tion in international capital markets are domestic capital and
labour market conditions. As concerns the latter, it has fre-
quently been argued that cheap labour represents a major element
of a country's attractiveness for foreign capital (see the
literature given in Section Il.l.b). Notwithstanding relatively
low unit-labour costs, however, a country may fail to become an
attractive investment location if a particularly poor endowment
with human capital is a binding constraint for economic develop-
ment and/or ineffective collective bargaining arrangements lead
to excessive labour market disputes. The competitive position of
Brazil as regards the three major aspects of labour market condi-
tions is evaluated in the following, before turning to domestic
capital markets (for a detailed analysis of the Brazilian labour
market, see SPINANGER [1988]).
Cross-country comparisons of unit-labour costs are flawed by con-
ceptual and data problems (for a comprehensive discussion, see
PICHT [1987b]). Although existing empirical findings mainly re-
fer to the mid-1980s, they indicate important policy challenges
facing the Brazilian government. Brazil had clear labour cost
advantages in manufacturing industries such as iron and steel as
well as automobile production during the 197 0s, not only vis-
a-vis industrialized countries but also vis-a-vis competitors- 63 -
such as South Korea [PICHT, 1987b; FISCHER, NUNNENKAMP et al.,
1988]. However, trends in unit-labour costs since the mid-1970s
showed a rise of unit-labour costs in Brazil, whereas cost reduc-
tions were achieved e.g. in Korea, Mexico and Taiwan. Brazil's
loss in unit-labour-cost advantages was partly due to relatively
large increases in hourly JLabour costs, and partly due to an
insufficient improvement of labour productivity. Most notably,
Brazil's position was increasingly challenged by a small group of
other newly industrializing countries.
This is rather unlikely to have changed significantly, notwith-
standing temporary setbacks in manufacturing earnings in recent
years. According to the WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [a], Brazil's
ranking continued to be extremely poor as far as labour producti-
vity developments are concerned. The poor record in terms of R &
D efforts and technological improvements points into the same
direction (see Appendix III). Therefore, it is important to rea-
lize that discrepancies between wage and productivity develop-
ments may at least partly be traced to a wide range of labour
market interventions. They comprise e.g.: minimum wages, regula-
tions on effective working time and job termination, non-wage
labour costs, etc. (SPINANGER [1988]; see also PORST [1991, pp.
126ff.]). Such policy measures may have contributed to the de-
terioration of Brazil's international competitive position, in
particular vis-a-vis the country's competitors in Asia where
labour markets have remained relatively free of policies either
directly or indirectly increasing labour costs. Hence, labour
market policies should be carefully reviewed and revised where
necessary.
Such a review should include collective bargaining arrangements
if they gave rise to excessive labour market unrest. Measured by
the number of strikes and lockouts per worker in the manu-
facturing sector, Brazil ranked in a medium position among 21
sample countries in 1985-1988 [HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al. , 1991,
Table 17]. But this situation marked a significant deterioration
of industrial relations during the 1980s. The number of strikes- 64 -
and lockouts per 1000 workers soared from 1.7 in 1981 to 26.1 in
1987. Frequent strikes and unofficial stoppages continued to be a
salient feature more recently [EIU, a, No. 2, 1989, p. 6], and
1990 saw "an increase in labour militancy" [ibid, No. 4, 1990, p.
7]. It is thus not surprising that Brazil ranked most unfavourab-
ly when experts were asked-to which extent industrial relations
in 10 newly industrializing countries were conducive to labour
peace (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [a, 1990, p. 227]; see also Appendix
III) .
Brazil's competitive position is similarly weak as concerns its
endowment with human capital, i.e. the third aspect of labour
market conditions. The scarcity of skilled labour can be traced
to the public education system and vocational training facilities
which are both inadequate to meet the requirements of a competi-
tive economy (see Appendix III). Further evidence is provided by
comparing the ratio of secondary school enrollees in per cent of
the respective population age cohort among developing countries
[HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al. , 1991, Table 18]. During the 1980s,
Brazil hardly succeeded to raise this ratio (1979-1984: 34-35 per
cent; 1985-1988: 37 per cent). Consequently, Brazil ranked at the
lower end of a sample of 26 countries in the late 1980s, and was
even surpassed by countries with significantly lower per-capita
income such as Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Peru, the Philip-
pines, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
In a summary assessment of labour market conditions in 95 coun-
tries, FROST & SULLIVAN [1988] placed Brazil in the least
attractive country group. The ranking was based on the avail-
ability of adequate labour, the level of wages, and the flexibi-
lity in the use of labour. This unfavourable position of Brazil
appears to be consistent with the evidence presented above.
As concerns domestic capital market conditions, the picture is
similarly bleak. This is already evident from Brazil's ranking in
See also EIU [b, p. 9]: "The quality of education has de-
teriorated dramatically since 1980".- 65 -
terms of financial dynamism as shown by the WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM
[a] (see also Table 6).' Moreover, a further deterioration of
Brazil's relative position is revealed by this organization over
the 1986-1990 period. The tail-light position in 1990 results
from the long list- of. individual indicators pointing to extremely
poor financial market conditions (Appendix III). Three factors
stand out: First of all, the Brazilian system of financial inter-
mediation is generally deficient and does not meet the require-
ments of an internationally competitive economy. Banks play a
limited role as a source of lending, and the range of financial
alternatives available to enterprises is fairly narrow. Secondly,
the government and state banks strongly interfere with the allo-
cation of financial resources. Private sector companies, and
particularly foreign enterprises (see also Section III.3.e), are
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the public sector in accessing capi-
tal markets. And, thirdly, lending for non-privileged enterprises
is expensive. Short-term interest rates were typically very high
in real terms in recent years (see e.g. EIU [a, No. 4, 1989, p.
10]), notwithstanding that the Constitution of 1988 commanded an
upper limit of 12 per cent.
The lending possibilities of banks have often been further con-
strained in the context of stabilization programs. A freeze on
lending was an element of the Summer Plan of early 1989. Simi-
larly, commercial lending was curtailed by the Collor-Plan which
asked the banks to use a significant share of their funds for
buying privatization certificates (Certificados de Privatizapao).
More generally, it is hardly possible to provide medium and long-
term investment loans because savers prefer extremely short-term
deposits (e.g. in the overnight market). It is thus not sur-
prising that bank credits contracted in real terms over much of
the 1980s [HIEMENZ, NUNNENKAMP et al, 1991, Table 13].
Financial deepening, proxied by the supply of broad money (M2)
relative to GDP, was found to be particularly poor in Brazil. The
country ranked at the bottom of the sample of 2 6 developing coun-
tries, and was again surpassed by many less advanced competitors- 66 -
[ibid]. This unfavourable position has, of course, largely to be
attributed to the highly inflationary environment in Brazil.
Extremely high rates of inflation contributed to the demonetiza-
tion of the economy. The evidence on financial deepening, hence,
provides another indication of the interrelatedness of policy
failures, and underlines the earlier conclusion that comprehen-
sive and consistent reforms are required to improve Brazil's
international competitiveness. Isolated financial market reforms
will be of limited use unless macroeconomic instability is con-
tained. At the same time, however, macro stabilization is un-
likely to do the job alone. The structural deficiencies of the
Brazilian financial system are clearly demonstrated by the fact
that financial deepening was lower than in other Latin American
countries which were plagued by similarly high inflation (e.g.
Argentina and Peru).
e. Attitudes towards Foreign Direct Investment
Brazil's relative attractiveness for FDI has deteriorated during
the 1980s, even though the country did not change dramatically
2
with respect to its overall openness towards FDI. This is be-
cause other major recipients of FDI in the Third World libera-
lized regulations to a considerable extent [UNCTC, 1988], leaving
Brazil with a relatively poor image in recent years. The deteri-
oration of Brazil's relative position is evident from Table 8,
which compares the ranking of developing countries in 1980 and
1988 with respect to their openness towards FDI:
- The 1980-ranking is based on an assessment by the Ifo-Institute
in Munich for 36 countries [OSTERKAMP, 1983]. This study covers
various aspects of FDI regulations, e.g. restrictions on: the
financing of FDI; locational choices; the use of imported and
For example, the indicator values of the proxy of financial
deepening were about twice and three times higher for Sri Lanka
and Uruguay as compared to Brazil in the mid-1980s.
2
The rather restrictive Lei da Informatica represented a notable
exception.- 67 -
Table 8 - Ranking of Developing Countries with Respect to
Their Openness towards FDI
























For explanations, see text. Only those countries are in-
cluded for which both rankings were available. Rank 1(21)
reveals the most open (closed) economy.
Source: OSTERKAMP [1983]; FROST & SULLIVAN [1988].
domestic inputs; employment opportunities; production technolo-
gies; production and distribution activities; pricing policies;
capital and profit remittances. Additionally, tax rates, the
administrative efficiency, uncertainties arising from dispute
settlement and expropriation risks were evaluated.
- The 1988-ranking is constructed from an assessment by FROST &
SULLIVAN [1988] for 95 countries. The nine criteria included in
the ranking of Table 8 are similar to the 1980-assessment:
controls on ownership, approval process, dispute settlement,
employment of nationals, performance requirements, exchange

































































The two rankings of Table 8 are not strictly comparable, due to
some differences in the selection of indicators and possible
national biases in the evaluation. However, the decline of Bra-
zil from the top to the bottom of the sample is too pronounced to
be only explained by such factors. A similarly drastic change in
the ranking (in the opposite direction) is only observed for
Korea, which opened up towards FDI in the 1980s. This supports
the view that the liberalization of FDI regulations in major
competing countries leaves much to be desired concerning Brazil's
attractiveness for FDI.
On closer inspection of the various criteria underlying the 1988-
ranking, some areas can be identified in which policy action is
most urgently required to improve Brazil's relative position.
Each country was scored by FROST & SULLIVAN [1988] on a 1-5
basis, with "1" being the least favourable and "5" being the most
favourable score. The picture for Brazil is as follows (the aver-
age score of all 95 countries for the respective criterion is
given as a reference measure in parentheses):
Score 4;
- Tax rates, i.e.: level of corporate taxes; discrimination
against foreign firms in tax policy (average: 2.93);
Score 3:
- Controls on ownership, i.e.: percentage of ownership allowed;
2
number of sectors in which ownership is permitted; require-
ments for joint ventures and regulations specifying that for-
eign assets must be sold to local interests after a specified
period of time (average: 3.44);
- Dispute settlement, i.e.: reliability of local courts and
administrative agencies in resolving disputes; discrimination
of foreign businesses vs. local interests; preferential treat-
For example, the assessment of the Ifo-Institute is mainly
based on "learned judgement" by German experts.
2
Most importantly, foreign activities in mining are strictly
limited [PORST, 1991, pp. 40 and 75].- 69 -
ment of some foreign investors over others; availability of
international dispute 'settlement for cases involving foreign
business (average: 3.55);
Score 2;
- Approval process, i.e.: the amount of time and expense involved
in obtaining required bureaucratic approvals; honesty and com-
petence of the bureaucracy; de-facto requirements for local
agents and cash outlays (average: 2.75);
- Employment of nationals, i.e.: the existence and enforcement of
quotas mandating employment of host country nationals; re-
quirements for local participation in management; residence
requirements for foreign nationals intended to limit expatriate
employment (average: 3.25);
- Performance requirements, i.e.: regulations concerning local
content, offsetting part of imports with exports, countertrade,
barter, and devoting a percentage of production to exports;
regulations concerning the use and sharing of technology (aver-
age: 3.42);
- Exchange controls, i.e.: ease of access to the foreign exchange
needed to conduct business; use of multiple exchange rates
(average: 3.08);
- Repatriation restrictions, i.e.: severity of restrictions on
repatriating profits and capital, including limitations and
taxes (average: 3.56);
- Investment incentives, i.e.: scope and magnitude of incentives
in the form of tax holidays, free trade zones, and subsidies
(average: 3.39).
The scoring of Brazil was better than the average for only one
criterion (tax rates). For six out of nine criteria, the country
was posited in a very unfavourable category (score 2). The devi-
ation from the sample average was most pronounced with respect to
performance requirements and repatriation restrictions. More
recent studies on the climate for foreign investment in Brazil
suggest that the picture has not changed fundamentally since the- 70 -
late 1980s [PORST, 1991]. One of the major concerns is that
restrictions imposed on" technology transfers may lead to a
technological isolation of Brazil. Bottlenecks are mainly due to
bureaucratic interference with licensing agreements, technology
contracts and consultancy [ibid, p. 96].
The overall picture on FDI policies in Brazil indicates that
reform requirements go far beyond the most recent steps to revive
FDI. In late May 1991, a proposal permitting FDI in the Brazilian
stock market was approved by the National Monetary Council. Until
recently, foreign institutional investors could only buy Brazili-
an stocks through foreign equity funds established in the coun-
try. Similar possibilities for foreign companies and individuals
are planned. Furthermore, a great potential for FDI is seen in
the context of debt-equity conversions linked to privatization
operations (see also EIU [a, No. 2, 1991, p. 15]). A Brazilian
debt fund which intended to invest in privatized companies
through debt conversion was in preparation in mid-1991 [WORLD
BANK, 1991]. It was announced that debt-equity swaps will be
accepted in privatization operations with a 25 per cent discount.
Given secondary market notations for Brazilian debt of about one
third of face value, this involves a considerable subsidization
of investors. Therefore, the conclusions drawn in Section Il.l.d
apply. Most importantly, FDI promotion schemes must not be mis-
understood as a substitute for a comprehensive review of restric-
tive FDI policies which have contributed to the country's im-
paired attractiveness for foreign risk capital.
It is noteworthy, however, that PORST [1991, p. 81] draws a
much more favourable picture as far as repatriation restric-
tions in Brazil are concerned. He points out that the govern-
ment generally refrained from imposing transfer restrictions
even when the foreign exchange situation was critical. Major
exceptions were delayed remittances in 1989 and the blocking of
dividend and profit remittances, which foreign investors had
deposited in central-bank accounts, in March 1990 (Collor-
Plan). Additional problems with which foreign investors are
confronted in Brazil comprise: strictly limited access to local
financing [EIU, b, p. 48; PORST, 1991, pp. 82f.], no access to
subsidized BNDES-credits, and discrimination of foreign compa-
nies in public procurement.- 71 -
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In the 1980s, developing countries - in particular in Latin Ame-
rica - were bypassed by international lenders and investors.
Negative net transfers out of commercial bank lending represented
the most serious problem facing Latin America since the outbreak
of the debt crisis. Private creditor banks were no longer pre-
pared to extend further credits so that even reduced debt-service
payments could not prevent net transfers from turning negative.
On top of that, most developing countries lost their attractive-
ness as hosts of foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to
industrialized countries. Latin American economies were signifi-
cantly affected by the reorientation of FDI towards the industri-
alized world. The increase of official development finance re-
mained by far insufficient to compensate the slump in private
financial flows to this region.
The dismal financial situation of most developing countries,
including Brazil, in the 1980s was mainly a consequence of the
inherited debt problems and deteriorating economic as well as
political conditions. Although far from being over, the debt
situation has slightly improved most recently, which is partly
due to debt-relief operations. Some debtor countries have
attempted to stabilize their economies and implemented structural
adjustment programs (e.g. Mexico). At the same time, net resource
flows to developing countries recovered slowly from the seriously
depressed level, and some heavily indebted countries regained
access to the international capital market to a limited extent.
Hence, most recent trends suggest that economic reforms in debtor
countries were honoured by foreign creditors and investors by
resuming capital transfers to these countries.
This recent experience supports previous cross-country analyses
on the role of domestic economic policies in attracting foreign
capital. Empirical results on the determinants of commercial bank
lending to developing countries indicate that it pays for borro-- 72 -
wers to implement adjustment programs in order to improve their
economic performance. Private creditors reacted to adjustment
efforts by easing credit constraints. This does not mean, how-
ever, that narrowly defined economic reforms are a sufficient
condition for a resumption of bank lending on a voluntary basis.
This qualification is particularly relevant for Latin America
where credibility and consistency problems have to be tackled in
the first instance.
Similar conclusions hold with respect to the attractiveness of
developing countries for FDI. Foreign investors were ready to
engage if the economic performance of a country offered good
profit opportunities. Empirical evidence on German FDI challenges
the widespread view that import protection by capital-recipient
countries is a promising means to attract FDI in the longer run.
Even fast growing economies with production cost advantages may,
however, fail to revive FDI inflows when the government's stance
towards foreign investors is overly restrictive and political and
economic instabilities are expected to continue in the future.
In general, foreign investors and foreign creditors responded in
a similar way to debt-related problems of capital-recipient coun-
tries, namely by limiting their engagement. This parallel behavi-
our renders it extremely difficult for debt-ridden Latin American
countries to change their external financing structure in favour
of FDI, unless the fundamental causes of impaired attractiveness
for foreign capital are overcome. Furthermore, the economic per-
formance effects of financial restructuring remain uncertain in
the presence of government regulations that hinder an efficient
use of debt and FDI inflows. This has important implications with
respect to debt conversion operations. Most notably, highly sub-
sidized - i.e. costly - debt-equity swaps must not be considered
to be an alternative to revise economic policies that have led to
an unproductive use of both types of foreign capital.
The empirical analyses on debt and FDI flows to developing coun-
tries suggest the following policy conclusions:- 73 -
- Internal adjustment efforts are absolutely necessary to regain
access to foreign capital. A fair degree of consensus has
emerged as concerns the crucial ingredients of promising reform
programs. Important elements are, e.g.: sustainable fiscal
consolidation, tax enhancement, deregulation of domestic finan-
cial markets, competitive -exchange rates, trade liberalization,
and openness towards FDI.
- There is no reason to be overly pessimistic about the capital-
inducing effects of domestic policy reform. Of course, it will
take time to restore the confidence of creditors and investors
once the credibility of governments has been substantially
eroded. To this end, policy-makers should be prepared to tie
their own hands, in order to reduce the uncertainties of econo-
mic agents whether governments will stick to a preannounced
policy course.
These policy conclusions remain valid even though a shortage of
global savings and the fiercer worldwide competition for invest-
ment funds may render it more difficult for developing countries
to attract foreign capital in the future. It would be a self-
defeating proposition to refrain from domestic adjustment efforts
in view of unfavourable international capital market conditions.
Quite the contrary: Only reform-minded countries will be able to
stand the fiercer competition for foreign capital, as well as to
contain the risks and to exploit the chances that emerge from the
recent changes in the international economic environment.
Immediate action is required especially in those countries which
are still suffering from a seriously impaired attractiveness for
foreign capital. This applies to Brazil in the first instance,
as the country appears to be lagging behind major competitors in
implementing credible and consistent reforms. The assessment of
different options to deal with the inherited debt problems of
Brazil reveals that persistent debtor-creditor confrontation is
likely to result in a low-growth scenario. Non-cooperative debt
policies do not only discourage foreign creditors to resume
lending, but also have adverse effects on other types of external- 74 -
finance (multilateral financial assistance and FDI). Furthermore,
it remains highly doubtful whether domestic resources retained
through debt repudiation or partial default will be invested
productively, unless the general investment climate is improved.
Hence, Brazil is well advised to strive for an agreement by which
the implementation of sound- economic policies would be supported
by voluntary debt and debt-service concessions. Experience
suggests that capital market re-entry would be realistic under
such circumstances.
To achieve such a deal, a serious attempt must be made to tackle
the internal bottlenecks to an improved attractiveness for
foreign capital. Ample evidence suggests that most of the factors
that led to the deterioration of Brazil's relative competitive
position in the past could be influenced or even removed by
appropriate policy measures. The subsequent policy areas deserve
priority attention:
- Macroeconomic stabilization: Without achieving greater macro-
economic stability, the credibility of any plan towards
structural reform is bound to be seriously eroded. It remains
the centerpiece of macroeconomic reforms to break inflationary
expectations. To this end, fiscal consolidation must be
sustainable, i.e. based on a growth-oriented restructuring of
government revenues and expenditures. Success at the inflation
front would also help to stabilize real exchange rates and,
thereby, plug another source of macro instability.
- Goods markets policies: The government should continue to re-
move policy-induced goods markets distortions. The recent pro-
gress achieved in dismantling trade barriers must be sustained
which, inter alia, requires to avoid exchange rate overvalua-
tion. Furthermore, liberalization at the external front must be
supplemented by discontinuing the tradition of interventionist
price policies in domestic markets. Sustainable fiscal re-
straint is a major precondition in this respect.
- Factor market policies: The competitive position of Brazil in
the global race for risk capital could also be improved if- 75 -
labour market deficiencies were overcome. It appears illusory
to expect that this could be achieved within short. Problems
such as insufficient labour productivity, non-cooperative in-
dustrial relations and the shortage of human capital seem to be
deep-routed in the socio-political climate of the country.
However, this must not be regarded as an excuse to carefully
review restrictive labour market regulations, and to evaluate
the possibilities for restructuring government spending in
favour of human-capital formation. Similarly, it may take time
to overcome the structural deficiencies of domestic financial
markets. But again there is scope for immediate policy action.
Most importantly, discriminatory practices with regard to the
allocation of financial resources should be discontinued.
- FDI policies; The recent liberalization of FDI regulations in
major competing countries (e.g. in Asia) leaves much to be
desired about Brazil's relative attractiveness for FDI. Reform
requirements go beyond the most recent steps to revive FDI. The
first priority should not be given to costly promotion schemes,
e.g. a subsidization of foreign investors in the context of
debt-equity swaps. It appears more promising to relax restric-
tive performance requirements, and to refrain from bureaucratic
interference with licensing agreements etc. so that Brazil
could benefit from technology transfers to a greater extent.
Obviously, the above policy areas are closely intertwined.
Structural reforms in particular markets may fail if macro-
economic instability is going to persist. At the same time, the
chances for macro stabilization could be improved if structural
weaknesses of factor and goods markets were overcome. Consequent-
ly, reform programs have to be comprehensive and consistent to
trigger a favourable response by foreign capital providers (and
domestic investors!). While consistency would help to restore
Brazil's attractiveness for foreign capital, a renewed inflow of
capital, in turn, would add to the sustainability of domestic
adjustment efforts. Hence, the government's principal aim must be
to restore the confidence of economic agents by designing a
credible reform program.- 76 -
Appendix I - Statistical Tables
I. Net Resource Flows
1.1. Total Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries: 1980-
1990
1.2. Total Net Resource Flows to Latin America and the Carib-
bean: 1980-1990
II. Bank Lending
11.1. Commercial Bank Claims on Developing Countries: 1986-1990
11.2. Commercial Bank Claims on Developing Countries - Selected
Creditors: 1985-1990
11.3a Commercial Bank Claims on Selected Latin American Coun-
tries - Selected Creditors: 1986
II.3b Commercial Bank Claims on Selected Latin American Coun-
tries - Selected Creditors: 1990
11.4. Commercial Bank Lending to Developing Countries-Disburse-
ments, Debt Service and Net Transfers: 1980-1989
11.5. Maturity Distribution of Bank Claims on Selected Latin
American Countries: 1990
III. Direct Investment
111.1. Foreign Direct Investment Flows: 1983-1989
111.2. Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Latin America - Selec-
ted Source Countries: 1980-1988
111.3. Structure of FDI Stocks by Area of Origin - Selected Latin
American Countries: the 1970s versus the 1980s
111.4. Foreign Investment and Reinvestment in Brazil: 1982-1990
IV. Official Development Finance
IV.1. Net Official Disbursements to Latin America: 1980-1988
IV.2. Net Official Disbursements to Brazil: 1980-1989
V. Capital Markets
V.I. Funds Raised on International Capital Markets: 1984-1991
V.2. Secondary Loan Prices: Selected Latin American Countries:
1986-1991Table I.I. - Total Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries: 1980-1990
I. Official development finance (ODF)









II. Total export credits
1. DAC countries
of which: short term
2. Other countries
III. Private flows
1. Direct investment (OECD)
of which: offshore centres,
2. International bank lending '
of which: short term
3. Total bond lending
4. Other private
5. Grants by non-governmental
organisations
Total net resource flows (I+II+III)
Memorandum items:
Total net credits from IMF ,
Recorded asset transactions, net


























































































































































































































































































































































Provisional. - Includes changes in interest arrears. Excludes Taiwan. - Accounting entries related to bonds for bank debt exchanges under the Mexi-
can debt restructuring of February 1990 are not reflected in this table. - Excludes Taiwan and offshore centres and, as regards transactions, changes
in offical reserves.
Source: OECD (1986, 1991a). - Own calculations.Table 1.2. - Total Net Resource Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean: 1980-1990
I. Official development finance (ODF)









II. Total export credits
1. DAC countries
of which: short term
2. Other countries
III. Private flows
1. Direct investment (DAC) ,
2. International bank lending '
3. Total bond lending
4. Other private






































































































































































































































































































Total net resource flows (I+II+III)
Memorandum items:
Total net credits from IMF d
Recorded asset transactions, net
Interest + dividends paid by IDCs,gross
Total offical grants



















































Provisional. - Includes changes in interest arrears and long- and short-term transactions. - Accounting entries related to bonds for bank debt exchanges under
the Mexican debt restructuring of February 1990 are not reflected in this table. - excludes offshore centres and, as regards transactions, changes in offical re-
serves.
Source: OECD (1989, 1991a). - Own calculations.Table II.1. - Commercial Bank Claims on Developing Countries: 1986-1990
USS billion
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1986
Per cent of total
1987 1988 1989 1990
All developing countries
By geographic region:




























































































































































































































































































































































































Tor Dutch carmercial banks and Japanese carmercial banks: 1987, for Italian carmercial banks: 1986. - For Italian and Swiss com-
mercial banks: 1989, for Japanese carmercial banks: 1988. - Third quarter. - Second quarter. - First quarter.














































































































































































aFrench commercial bank claims: second quarter.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Percentage values refer to Latin America and not to world total. - Not necessarily comparable to previous data.
Figure is based on the US$ rate of December 31, 1990. Banco Central do Brasil (1991).
Source: IMF (1990). - Own calculations.Table III.2. - Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Latin America - Selected Source


















































































Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. - The share of these six countries on FDI from Europe is
91 per cent for 1980-82; 89.7 per cent for 1983-85; 89.4 per cent for 1986-88.
Source: Secchi (1991).Table III.3. - Structure of FDI Stocks by Area of Origin - Selected Latin American Countries: the 1970s




































































































































































"Cumulated authorised investment for the period,
period.
b c
Excludes the oil sector. - Cumulated investment for
the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aData on Venezuela were not available. - Percentage of world total flows to Latin America. -
 cPercentage of
flows of the respective category to all developing countries. - Flows from the EC as an institution and its
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries combined. - Abbreviations: Official development
finance (ODF), official development assistance (ODA), other official flows (OOF).




of which ODA grants
ODA loans
OOF
EC & Members: Total receipts
ODF




































































































































































































































































































of which ODA grants
ODA loans
OOF
United Kingdom: Total receipts
ODF
of which ODA grants
ODA loans
OOF
United States: Total receipts
ODF





































































































































































































































































1 receipts are shown as a memorandum item. They include in addition to OOF in particular guaranteed export credits, private direct investment and
portfolio investment. - Abbreviations: Official development finance (ODF), official development assistance (ODA), other official flows (OOF).



































































































































































































An "international bond" issue is one that is placed simultaneously on the market of at least two countries and is denortdnated in a currency which
need not necessarily be that of either. - A "foreign bond" issue is one which is placed, generally by a domestic syndicate, on the market of a
single country.

























































































































































































aPrices after February 1990 refer to par bonds offered under the Brady Initiative. - Prices after December 1990 refer to par bonds offered under the
Brady Initiative. -
 cPrices after August 1990 refer to par bonds offered under the Brady Initiative.
Source: World Bank (1988, 1991).
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= net transfers out of public and publicly guaranteed
credits from private creditors plus total
non-guaranteed private loans;
= disbursements of the same types of debt.
b) Explanatory variables
INVR = gross fixed capital formation as per cent of GDP;
WMSHD = annual change in world-export-market share;
REXR = annual change in real effective exchange rate; (nega-
tive values indicate depreciation);
DEFR = government budget deficit as per cent of GDP (negative
values for deficits);
TOT = annual change in the terms of trade;
DSERG = debt service on long-term debt as per cent of GNP;
TRADE = imports plus exports as per cent of GDP;
SHDEX = short-term debt as per cent of exports;
STDG = fluctuation in real GDP.
Source: IMF [b; c]; UNCTAD [a, 1988]; WORLD BANK [b, 1988].
Equation (1) on page 24
a) Dependent variable:
FDIR = deflated German gross FDI outflows;
b) Explanatory variables:
YR = real GNP of sample countries;
EXRG = German exports to sample countries in per cent of the
sample countries' GNP;
EXDMR = real exchange rate (local currency per DM);
TAR = unweighted average of total import charges (tariffs and
para-tariffs);
GU = see below (Table 4);
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [unpublished data base]; World Bank
[c]; IMF [b; c]; UNCTAD [b].
Table 4
a) Dependent variable
DIUSD = total FDI flows from all sources to sample countries
[IMF, a];- 95
b) Explanatory variables
Section A: Traditional explanations
EXUS = local currency per US-Dollar, period averages [IMF, c];
GNP = gross national product of sample countries;
dYR = change of real GNP of sample countries, in prices and
exchange rates of 1980 [WORLD BANK, c];
TLC = total hourly labour costs in manufacturing [RIVEROS,
1989; IMF, c];
VAD1 = real value added in manufacturing (in prices of 1980)
per employee [WORLD BANK, c; UNIDO, a];
VAD2 = VAD1 in 1980 multiplied with the index for real output
per employee (1980=100) [WORLD BANK, c; UNIDO, a];
GU = classification of sample countries with regard to their
attitudes towards FDI; 0 = restrictive; 1 = quite re-
strictive; 2 = semi-open; 3 = open (own judgement; for
details, see AGARWAL et al. [1991, Chapter IV]).







= proxy for political instability; 1 = unstable govern-
ment characterized by more frequent changes of party or
parties in power and/or occurrence of riots or military
coup d'etats or border conflicts; 0 = stable government
characterized by no or less frequent changes of power
by democratic means and absence of riots, political
unrest, military coup d'etats or border conflicts
[BANKS, 1989];
= political strikes and lockouts measured as the number
of workdays lost per employed person [ILO, a];
= structural and sectoral adjustment loans received by
the host developing countries; "1" is assigned to a
country for the year in which SSL is received by it,
and "0" for the remaining years and countries without
adjustment loans [NICHOLAS, 1988];
= three-period moving average of annual rate of infla-
tion, based on consumer price indices (1979-80=100)
[UNCTAD, a, Table 2.9];
= three-period moving average of gross domestic invest-
ment as a percentage of GDP [UNCTAD, a, Table 6.4];
=.stock of FDI, lagged by three periods.
Section C: Debt overhang
DII = change in the credit rating since 1980 [INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, a];
GDP = gross domestic product of sample countries.
Section D: Sovereign risk
BENST = stock of total FDI over GDP [UNCTAD, a; IMF, a];
PRESCU = proxy for the balance-of-payments situation of sample
countries; three-period moving average of the current-
account deficit (surplus) in per cent of GDP; negative
values of PRESCU in the case of deficits [IMF, a].- 96 -
UMS = proxy for foreign debt problems of sample countries,
twice lagged; 0 = no reschedulings; 1 .= reschedulings
with official creditors; 2 = reschedulings with private
creditors; 3 = reschedulings with both official and
private creditors [WORLD BANK, b, 1989; HARDY, 1982];





= aggregate investment as per cent of GDP;
= annual per-capita growth rate of GDP.
b) Explanatory variables
FDI = foreign direct investment;
AID = official grants;
DEBT = total debt inflows.
Source: IMF [c]; OECD [a]; WORLD BANK [a, 1983; c, 1984]- 97 -
Appendix III - Major Bottlenecks to an Improved Competitiveness
of Brazil
The subsequent factors appear to have contributed significantly
to the relatively weak competitive position of Brazil vis-a-vis
nine other newly industrializing countries. The list is based on
the evaluation of competitiveness by the WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM [a,
1990], and individual indicators are grouped according to the ten
"principal factors of competitiveness" given there. The list is
highly selective; it covers only a minor fraction of the more
than 300 indicators considered by the WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. The
focus is on those areas in which the Brazilian ranking within the
country sample was most unfavourable (rank positions 8 to 10),
and which may provide scope for a policy-induced improvement of
competitiveness.
Dynamism of the economy
- low real growth of per-capita GDP and industrial production;
- poor short-term economic prospects (next 2 years).
Industrial efficiency
- unfavourable trend in labour productivity;
- inadequate use of computer-based information technology;
- strong inflationary pressures;
- dominance of a limited number of enterprises, which is detri-
mental to new business development.
Market orientation
- limitations on the freedom of companies to set prices;
- no open competition for public works and procurement.
Financial dynamism
- high budget deficits;
- poor country-credit rating;
In general, the indicators reflect the situation at the end of
the 1980s. Growth rates typically refer to the period 1982-
1988. The time horizon of expectations is given where avail-
able.- 98 -
- relatively low gross domestic savings rate;
- banking sector interferes with business enterprises;
- limited role of banks as a source of private-sector credit;
- private sector is at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the public sector
in accessing capital markets;
- limited availability of venture capital;
- limited availability of reasonably priced export credits and
export insurance;
- high real short-term interest rates;
- few financial alternatives available to enterprises;
- restrictive financial regulatory framework;
- management is not free to allocate profits in an optimal way
for the company;
- insufficient depreciation allowances and tax benefits that en-
courage capital expansion;
- enterprises are not free to transfer, consolidate or divest
corporate assets;
- limitations on cross-border financial movements;
- non-competitive banking and financial services in newly de-
regulated global markets.
Human resources
- lack of new employment opportunities (over the next 3 years);
- vocational training does not meet the requirements of a com-
petitive economy;
- compulsory education system does not meet the requirements of a
competitive economy;
- low secondary school-enrollment ratio;
- limited availability of skilled labour;
- insufficient management education and managerial initiative;
- inadequate health-care facilities for workers and their fami-
lies .
Impact of the state
- high growth of government consumption in GDP;
- work disincentives arising from taxation and social security
systems;- 99 -
- unequal fiscal treatment among enterprises;
- fiscal policy does not stimulate corporate investment and
entrepreneurial activity;
- poor responsiveness of government in adapting legislation to
new economic realities;
- high government subsidies -in per cent of GDP;
- government does not use its resources to promote industrial
competitiveness;
- government rules, regulations and bureaucracy restrain effici-
ent and profitable conduct of business;
- government priorities directed towards income redistribution,
rather than investment and growth.
Natural endowment utilization
- government's agricultural policies favour political interests
over long-term needs;
- high energy imports in per cent of merchandise exports.
International orientation
- relatively low growth of exports of goods and services;
- limited flexibility of producers in modifying products to suit
foreign markets;
- relatively high degree of exchange-rate instability (parity
changes to SDR);
- exchange-rate policy discourages international competitiveness;
- high trade barriers prevent the importation of goods, services
and capital to a great extent;
- restrictive local-content requirements;
- pressure groups limit new industrial developments to a great
extent;
- trade legislation and trade practices are not conducive to
long-term competitiveness;
- businesses are inadequately prepared to exploit the chances
offered by the European market by 1992 and the US/Canadian
free-trade agreement;
- inadequate government support for investing abroad;
- limited extent to which foreign inbound investment is welcome;- 100 -
- foreign investors cannot rely on government pledges for facili-
ties ;
- limitations for foreign investors to acquire controlling inter-
ests in companies;
- low government support for procurement abroad;
- limitations on the freedom of enterprises to negotiate ven-
tures;
- limitations on expatriate work permits.
Future orientation
- limited extent to which firms take a long-term view;
- ineffectiveness of market forces in redeploying resources in
traditional industries;
- reluctance of enterprises to invest over the next 2 years;
- low expected increase of R & D spending over the next five
years;
- low degree of synergies developed between state and private R &
D efforts;
- insufficient protection of intellectual property rights dis-
courages corporate R & D;
- low efficiency of companies in seeking new technologies and
commercially exploiting them.
Socio-political stability
- low stability of the country's socio-political climate;
- low general economic literacy;
- limited confidence in the administration of justice;
- threats of expropriation of personal or corporate assets;
- low effectiveness of businesses in gaining public acceptance of
corporate views and concerns;
- industrial relations are not conducive to labour peace;
- organized labour affects corporate operations considerably;
- unequal income distribution;
- country does not prevent corruption;
- low degree of public consensus on government economic policies;
- long-term protection of environment not adequately addressed.- 101 -
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